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ABSTRACT
New Deal cooperatives succeeded in electrifying rural America when forprofit utilities would not. Today, however, rural electric cooperatives are
lagging behind when it comes to meeting the challenge of climate change.
Cooperatives have collectively been slower to embrace the shift to low-carbon
electricity than for-profit and municipal utilities and have served as a drag on
state and federal clean energy and climate policies. This is partially because of
the structural differences between cooperatives and other utilities, but also
because of a weak and underdetermined federal and state regulatory structure.
A few cooperatives in Colorado and New Mexico are seeking to lead the charge
to a low-carbon electricity system, but they are finding themselves stymied by
their own power supply cooperative. Drawing on insights from organization,
public choice, and energy regulation theories, this Article argues that
institutional incentives at power supply cooperatives inhibit prudent resource
planning in a time of climate change. It concludes that cooperatives need
significant changes to state and federal regulatory structures to counter these
factors. These changes include subjecting power supply cooperatives to
rigorous integrated resource planning requirements and providing state utility
commissions oversight over power supply contract buy-out fees. It also includes
reconsidering the wholesale electricity rate structure between power supply and
distribution cooperatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the signature achievements of the New Deal was the
electrification of rural America, which was accomplished chiefly through the
formation of rural cooperatives bankrolled by federal loans.1 At a time when
less than 10% of the rural United States was electrified, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Congress made available hundreds of millions of dollars in
subsidized loans to bring electric power to farms across America.2 Private,
for-profit utilities refused to carry out this sweeping rural electrification effort
– even with government subsidies – in large part because of the expense of
serving poor and sparsely-populated areas.3 Federal administrators therefore
looked to a model for rural electrification that was used successfully in Europe
and had been tried in a few areas in the United States: customer-owned nonprofit cooperatives. The federal loan program gave preference to cooperatives
and government-owned utilities over for-profit utilities and helped rural
communities organize such cooperatives.4
The program, carried out by the Rural Electrification Administration
(“REA”) and later the Rural Utilities Service (“RUS”),5 was strikingly
successful. Two years after it was started in 1936, “more than 350 projects in

1. ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A POLITICAL LIFE 220 (2017).
2. Establishing the Rural Electrification Administration, Exec. Order No. 7037
(1935), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order7037-establishing-the-rural-electrification-administration [perma.cc/VP39-Z9BU];
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2018); Carl Kitchens & Price
Fishback, Flip the Switch: The Impact of the Rural Electrification Administration
1935–40, 75 J. ECON. HIST. 1161, 1163 (2015); see generally D. CLAYTON BROWN,
ELECTRICITY FOR RURAL AMERICA: THE FIGHT FOR THE REA 50 (1980).
3. BROWN, supra note 2, at 50; Debra C. Jeter et al., Democracy and
Dysfunction: Rural Electric Cooperatives and the Surprising Persistence of the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 70 ALA. L. REV. 361, 381–82 (2018).
4. Jeter et al., supra note 3; BROWN, supra note 2, at 13–21. A frequently cited
definition of a cooperative is:
[A]n organization established by individuals to provide themselves with goods
and services or to produce and dispose of the products of their labor. The
means of production and distribution are those owned in common and the
earnings revert to the members, not on the basis of their investment in the
enterprise but in proportion to their patronage or personal participation in it.
Cooperatives may be divided roughly into consumer cooperatives and
producer cooperatives.

Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Comm’r, 44 T.C. 305, 306 (1965).
5. BROWN, supra note 2. The REA was renamed the RUS in 1994 in a
reorganization of the Department of Agriculture. Laurence J. Malone, Rural
Electrification Administration, EH.Net (Mar. 16, 2008) https://eh.net/encyclopedia/ru
ral-electrification-administration/ [perma.cc/6MQ3-CXJT].
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forty-five states [were delivering electricity to] 1,450,000 farms.”6 These
electricity distribution cooperatives went on to form power supply
cooperatives – cooperatives of cooperatives – to build and own power plants
and high-voltage transmission lines.7 By the mid-1950s most American farms
had electrical service.8 The REA’s electrification of America “is considered
one of the most immediate and profound successes in the history of federal
policy-making for the national economy.”9
Today over 800 rural electric distribution cooperatives provide
electricity to 42 million people in 48 states, approximately 13% of the U.S.
population.10 Many of these cooperatives purchase wholesale power from 62
power supply cooperatives.11 Collectively, electric cooperatives serve 56%
of the U.S. land mass and supply 13% of U.S. electricity.12
Now, however, addressing the challenge of climate change will require
the “near-complete decarbonization” of the U.S. electricity industry by
2050.13 Electric utilities will need to shut down nearly all of their coal and
natural gas power plants and shift instead to renewable energy and other
sources of zero-carbon electricity in the next twenty to thirty years.
This challenge occurs while the domestic electricity sector undergoes
other dramatic changes. Building natural gas, wind, or solar power plants is
now cheaper than building coal power plants due to rapid declines in the cost
of natural gas fuel and renewable technologies.14 And after 100 years of
relying exclusively on centralized power plants, the domestic electricity
system is now flooded with decentralized actors that can supply electricity
and other services to the grid, upending the traditional utility business model.
Within this changing environment, and despite the lack of a
comprehensive federal climate policy, utilities across the nation have
significantly decarbonized their generating portfolios over the past decade.
Since 2005, electric utilities have cut carbon dioxide emissions by 28%.15
6. BROWN, supra note 2, at 69.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. Malone, supra note 5.
10. Nat’l Rural Electric Cooperative Ass’n, America’s Electric Cooperatives:
2019 Fact Sheet, AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (April 23, 2019),
https://www.electric.coop/electric-cooperative-fact-sheet/ [perma.cc/48XG-WKKP].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. THE WHITE HOUSE, United States Mid-Century Strategy for Deep
Decarbonization 48 (2016), available at https://unfccc.int/files/focus/longterm_strategies/application/pdf/mid_century_strategy_report-final_red.pdf
[perma.cc/S3U7-XAWS].
14. Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis, LAZARD (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-and-levelized-cost-ofstorage-2018/ [perma.cc/46MA-QPQR].
15. Perry Lindstrom, Carbon Dioxide Emission from the U.S. Power Sector Have
Declined 28% Since 2005, U.S. ENERGY INFOR. ADMIN. (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37392 [perma.cc/T64R-YMNB].
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While these reductions are not sufficient to address climate change, they
represent critical and needed progress in the absence of a comprehensive
federal climate policy.
These utilities are cutting carbon primarily because it makes economic
sense. To take advantage of low natural gas prices resulting from the fracking
boom, utilities have shifted from coal-fired power plants to cheaper, lesscarbon-polluting natural gas power plants. Federal renewable energy tax
credits, state renewable energy mandates, and falling renewable technology
costs have combined to make wind energy, and increasingly solar energy, the
cheapest forms of new electricity to construct.16 Moreover, most utility
executives are betting that their firms will eventually be subject to substantial
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) standards, even if the Trump Administration has
rolled back the climate regulations established by the Obama
Administration.17 Putting all of these factors together, utilities have generally
been shifting to lower-carbon electricity generation portfolios.

Note that several reports found that power sector carbon dioxide emissions rose in
2018 after over a decade of reductions. Preliminary US Emissions Estimates for 2018,
RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 8, 2019), https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissionsestimates-for-2018/ [perma.cc/8YA3-4QU6].
16. Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis, supra note 14, at 2.
17. Affordable Clean Energy Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (2019). The Trump
Administration’s Affordable Clean Energy Rule rescinded and replaced the Obama
Administration’s Clean Power Plan regulation. Id. Whereas the Clean Power Plan
was projected to reduce US electricity-sector carbon emissions by over 200 million
short tons in the fifth year of compliance and over 400 million short tons in the tenth
year compared to a no-rule scenario, the Affordable Clean Energy Rule is never
projected to decrease emissions by more than 12 million short tons in any year.
Compare U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL CLEAN POWER PLAN,
REGULATORY
IMPACT
ANALYSIS
ES-4
and
ES-5
(2015),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-clean-power-planexisting-units_2015-08.pdf [perma.cc/SE8Q-RDWM], with
U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL CLEAN POWER PLAN, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
ES-4
and
ES-5
(2019),
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-airpollution/regulatory-impact-analysis-repeal-clean-power-plan-and-emission
[perma.cc/3QED-C6DW]; see also Umair Iran, Trump’s EPA Just Replaced Obama’s
Signature Climate Policy with a Much Weaker Rule, VOX (June 19, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/2019/6/19/18684054/climate-change-clean-power-plan-repealaffordable-emissions [perma.cc/Z3L2-LTSF]. In industry surveys utility executives
broadly state that they would prefer climate regulation, and analysts cite the
expectation of future regulations as one of the reasons that many utilities are setting
or maintaining climate goals even during the Trump Administration’s rollback of the
Clean Power Plan. Amy Gahran, State of the Electric Utility: 2019 Survey Report 48
(2019), https://resources.industrydive.com/State-of-the-Electric-Utility-2019-SurveyReport [perma.cc/HF82-M3CB]; Dan Bakal, Committing to Climate: Transformation
is Underway in the US Power Sector, UTILITY DRIVE (Apr. 22, 2019),
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Cooperative utilities, however, have generally lagged behind in this
shift. Power supply cooperatives rely on coal-fired power plants to a much
greater degree than for-profit or municipal utilities, and they have been slower
to retire these power plants.18 From 2009 to 2017, the electric power sector
as a whole reduced carbon emissions by 23%, but cooperatives reduced
emissions by only 9%.19 Among the 100 largest power producers in the
United States – which includes ten power supply and distribution cooperatives
– six out of the top ten most carbon-intensive emitters were cooperatives.20
In an important case study highlighted in this Article, Tri-State Generation
and Transmission Association, Inc. (“Tri-State”) – one of the largest power
supply cooperatives – has until recently repeatedly stymied efforts of some of
its distribution cooperatives to accelerate a transition to a lower-carbon
electricity system.21 Tri-State also was endeavoring to build a new coal-fired
power plant at a time when most utilities were shifting away from coal.22
Cooperatives have also been slower to move to renewable energy and to
implement energy efficiency.23
This Article seeks to explain why cooperatives are lagging behind.
Drawing on the insights of organization theory, public choice, and theories of
energy governance, this Article argues that a combination of structural
barriers, institutional incentives, and a weak system of governance and
regulation inhibit prudent resource planning in the face of the climate change
challenge. The Article also identifies ways that cooperative oversight and
supports can be strengthened to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon
electricity system.
Even though rural electricity cooperatives serve a relatively small
portion of the population, they represent an important piece of the puzzle in
finding policy solutions for climate change. For one, cooperatives are
responsible for a significant portion of electric-sector carbon emissions.
Cooperatives account for 6% of the carbon emissions of the largest 100
utilities even though they account for only 4% of electricity generated by this
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/committing-to-climate-transformation-isunderway-in-the-us-power-sector/553067 [perma.cc/NK8P-SH2X].
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. Compare Nat’l Rural Electric Cooperative Ass’n, supra note 10 (citing to
EPA and EIA data), with ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. Electric
Power Industry Estimated Emissions by State EIA-767, EIA-906, EIA-920, and EIA923, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ [perma.cc/6SC6-SZ7M] (carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions for total electric power industry, 2009-2017).
20. CHRISTOPHER VAN ATTEN ET AL., BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS OF THE
100 LARGEST ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCERS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2019),
https://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/Presentation_of_Results_2019.pdf
[perma.cc/3FKL-XP3T]. This means that they emitted more carbon pollution for each
megawatt hour of electricity produced across their fleet of power plants. Id.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Miriam Fischlein et al., Carbon Emissions and Management Scenarios
for Consumer-Owned Utilities, 12 ENV. SCI. & POL’Y 778, 782 (2009).
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group.24 Achieving decarbonization will require dramatic reductions from all
electric utilities, including cooperatives.
Cooperatives are important for other reasons. Cooperatives serve less
affluent communities, and these communities will feel the effects of any rate
increases to a greater degree.25 This is doubly true because unlike for-profit
utilities, any business losses sustained by cooperatives will also be borne by
cooperative member-owners as a loss in the equity that they have paid into the
cooperative (referred to as patronage capital).26 No separate shareholders
absorb losses from bad business decisions made by cooperative managers.
Therefore, shifting to a low-carbon electricity system poses unique equity
issues for rural electricity cooperatives.
Moreover, polling has found that rural residents are somewhat less likely
to believe in climate change than their urban counterparts.27 At the same time,
cooperatives wield outsized political power at both federal and state levels,
and they have used that power to lobby against federal and state climate and
clean energy legislation.28 Cooperatives therefore also pose a unique political
challenge when it comes to advancing climate policy. Identifying and
mitigating structural and governance barriers that make it harder for
cooperatives to transition to a low-carbon economy can help reduce
cooperative political opposition to climate policymaking.
The importance of rural electricity cooperatives for climate policy was
underscored by 2020 Democratic Presidential primary campaigns. Several
prominent candidates – Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Inslee –
released proposals focusing on how to equitably reduce emissions in rural

24. VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 18. Calculations of the author based on
2017 data set published by M.J. Bradley and Associates supporting their
Benchmarking Air Emissions report. Id.
25. See NAT’L RURAL ELEC. CO-OP. ASS’N, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REPEAL OF
CARBON POLLUTION EMISSIONS GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING STATIONARY SOURCES
(2018). “In 2015, the median household income for electric cooperative consumers
was 11% below the national average.” Id. at 8.
26. See infra Part III.C.
27. Peter D. Howe et al., Geographic Variation in Opinions on Climate Change
at State and Local Scales in the USA, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 596, 604 (2015).
Belief that global warming is happening is “signiﬁcantly lower” in rural counties than
in the nation’s largest cities. Id.
28. Fischlein et al., supra note 23, at 780.
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communities.29 Bernie Sanders held up cooperatives as a superior alternative
to for-profit utilities because they represent a form of public ownership.30
An in-depth examination evidences, however, that cooperatives are
underperforming their for-profit and municipally-owned utility counterparts
when it comes to decarbonization at this time. The New Deal demonstrated
that the cooperative model can harness community initiative to solve
problems the market fails to address. This Article aims to identify how the
current system of cooperative regulation and incentives can fail to prompt
prudent resource planning by cooperatives in the face of climate change and
to identify ways that the system can be adapted to better harness the benefits
of cooperatives to meet this challenge.
Many energy law scholars have argued that governance and regulation
of the energy sector will need to change significantly to facilitate the shift to
a low-carbon economy.31 A few scholars have recently focused on the role
that public municipal utilities can play in this shift.32 Several scholars have
also critiqued the rural electric cooperative system more generally,

29. See The Green New Deal, BERNIESANDERS.COM, https://berniesanders.com/e
n/issues/green-new-deal/ [perma.cc/7XHL-CSR7] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020)
(promising that all clean energy will be publicly owned, including through
cooperatives); Elizabeth Warren, My Plan for 100% Clean Energy, MEDIUM (Sept. 3,
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/100-clean-energy-for-america-de75ee398
87d [perma.cc/5NNW-ZPJP] (promising to provide grants for clean energy projects
through RUS);
Growing Rural Prosperity, JAY INSLEE FOR GOVERNOR,
https://www.jayinslee.com/issues/growing-rural-prosperity
[perma.cc/M3LZXYBY] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (promising to create a “Next-Generation Rural
Electrification initiative”).
30. The Green New Deal, supra note 29.
31. See e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 1614, 1621–22 (2013) (arguing that a revitalized and broad sense of public
utility will be necessary “to decarbonize the power sector by midcentury”); Joel B.
Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 49 (2018)
(proposing a legal framework for a free electricity trading system that could be more
responsive to climate change); Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory
Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016) (proposing an updated
version of the “regulatory contract” that can mediate between competing energy policy
visions for more competitive markets and an “ever-greener” mix of electricity
generation); Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 371 (2014) (arguing that Public Utility Commission regulatory structure must be
changed in order for the “utility system [to] become significantly greener, more
efficient, and less reliant on fossil fuels”); Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky,
Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143
(2016) (arguing that lowering carbon emissions will require enhancements of
“regional approaches to generation capacity planning and transmission expansion, the
interconnection of generator to lines, and energy markets”).
32. See Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 ENVTL. L. 105 (2016);
Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877 (2010);
Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (2017).
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highlighting management problems, economic inefficiency, and a failure to
provide low rates.33 Until now, however, there has been no legal scholarship
that has considered how oversight of and incentives for rural electric
cooperatives will need to change to support decarbonization of the electricity
system.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes how and why the New
Dealers turned to cooperatives to electrify rural America and why
cooperatives were largely exempted from the economic regulation imposed
on for-profit utilities. It concludes by highlighting some of the successes and
challenges that cooperatives have faced. Part II presents an overview of
available data demonstrating that cooperatives lag behind when it comes to
shifting to a lower-carbon resource mix. It also identifies two important
structural barriers: many cooperatives built coal-fired power plants in the
1980s because of a federal mandate and many cooperatives cannot take direct
advantage of federal renewable energy tax credits. Part II concludes with a
case-study of Tri-State and its member distribution cooperatives,
demonstrating how and why a power supply cooperative can frustrate
attempts by member cooperatives seeking to accelerate clean energy
deployment. It also describes how member unrest and state policies have
prompted a significant change of course. Part III identifies four factors that
inhibit prudent resource decision making within cooperatives. These include
the frequently distant and diffuse benefits of addressing climate change, the
counter incentives cooperative managers have to invest in fossil fuel power
plants that grow organizational size and revenue, and the threat to the power
supply cooperative business model presented by shifting to low-carbon
resources. Part IV concludes by suggesting regulatory changes as well as
incentives and technical support that would remove structural barriers,
counter unhelpful institutional incentives and strengthen resource planning
oversight. Chief among these changes is subjecting power supply
cooperatives to rigorous integrated resource planning (“IRP”) requirements
and power supply contract buy-out fee oversight by state public utility
commissions or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). It
also suggests that the RUS support the abandonment of coal-fired power

33. See W. G. Beecher, Is It Time to Revoke the Tax-Exempt Status of Rural
Electric Cooperatives?, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 221 (2013)
(arguing rural cooperatives have begun to resemble for-profit entities and therefore
their tax-exempt status should be revoked); Jim Cooper, Electric Co-Operatives:
From New Deal to Bad Deal Policy Essay, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (2008); Richard
P. Keck, Reevaluating the Rural Electrification Administration: A New Deal for the
Taxpayer, 16 ENVTL. L. 39 (1985) (arguing cooperative subsidies are a bad deal for
taxpayers with “little or no public policy justification remaining”); Jeter et al., supra
note 3 (arguing that creating a market for cooperatives could create improvements in
cooperative governance).
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plants and encourage revisions to the wholesale electricity rate structure
between power supply and distribution cooperatives.
Cooperatives realized a singular achievement in the electrification of
rural America. Strategic changes to the oversight and support mechanisms of
cooperatives can better position cooperatives to lead a similar response to the
challenge of climate change.

II. COOP HISTORY AND GOVERNANCE
To understand why cooperatives lag behind in the shift to the low-carbon
economy, it’s important to understand how cooperatives came to electrify
America and how a system of federal and state regulation was established over
them. This Section first describes how the federal government promoted and
financed a cooperative rural electricity system; it then explains why
cooperatives were largely exempted from a system of regulation that was
established for for-profit utilities. The last part of this Section overviews
historical successes and challenges faced by these member-owned
institutions.

A. New Dealers Turned to Coops to Electrify Rural America34
1. Cities Electrified Quickly; the Countryside Did Not
The city of Cleveland was the first to light up its town square in 1879,
and after that both the technology and business of electricity developed
rapidly.35 During its first couple of decades, electricity was produced in small
generating stations in towns and cities and transmitted short distances to
homes and businesses.36 Electric companies competed to provide services in
towns. By the end of the World War I, most city residents had electricity.37
The countryside was another story. Rural electrification posed economic
challenges. Farms were far apart – on average there were only two to five
dwellings per mile – and the distances between residences required a much
greater investment in poles and wires.38 Utilities generally expected rural

34. In general, for the history of the development of the early electricity sector
and lead up to the creation of the REA, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 13–21; RICHARD
RUDOLPH & SCOTT RIDLEY, POWER STRUGGLE: THE HUNDRED-YEAR WAR OVER
ELECTRICITY 82 (1986); PHILIP J. FUNIGIELLO, TOWARD A NATIONAL POWER POLICY:
THE NEW DEAL AND THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY, 1933–1941 (1973); Kitchens
& Fishback, supra note 2; H.S. Person, The Rural Electrification Administration in
Perspective, 24 AGRIC. HIST. 70 (1950); Morris Llewellyn Cooke, The Early Days of
the Rural Electrification Idea: 1914–1936, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 431 (1948).
35. RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 34, at 24.
36. Id. at 28.
37. See Kitchens & Fishback, supra note 2, at 1163 (“By 1930, almost every
major city and town in the United States was electrified.”).
38. FREDERICK WILLIAM MULLER, PUBLIC RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 7–8 (1944).
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customers to finance extensions of distribution service.39 Moreover, farmers
had limited income, and electric power equipment was not yet widely adopted,
so utilities expected low revenue with which to amortize investments into
distribution infrastructure.40
Only 10% of U.S. farms were electrified by the 1930s.41 Other countries
were proving that widespread rural electrification was possible. Sweden,
France, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Denmark had achieved 50 to 90% rural
electrification at that time.42
Progressives of the 1920s, and eventually the New Dealers of the 1930s,
seized on rural electrification as a solution to multiple challenges plaguing
rural America, including poor health outcomes and quality of life.
Electrification could substantially reduce work on the farm – especially for
women – and provide more leisure time through electrified lighting.43
Electrification could also reduce disease, as electric pumps would bring
running water and indoor plumbing.44 Moreover, progressives were
concerned about the increasing migration from farms to cities, and they
viewed electrification as one of the attractions of urban living.45
The for-profit electric industry also expressed interest in rural
electrification as a potential way to grow business. In 1923, the electric power
industry’s trade association initiated an effort to educate famers on the uses of
electricity and launch demonstration projects in a few communities.46 It did
not address the high cost of rural power, however, and as a result, it failed to
achieve any significant increase in rural electrification.47

39. Id. at 16.
40. BROWN, supra note 2, at 5.
41. Id. at 16. Similarly, in 1925 in Pennsylvania, only 12% of farms had
electricity of any type. REPORT OF THE GIANT POWER SURVEY BOARD TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, at 37 (1925)
[hereinafter GIANT POWER SURVEY].
42. BROWN, supra note 2 at 16–17. The geography of rural communities in these
countries made electrification easier. For example, in many instances, farmers would
live in a town.
43. HOWARD HAMPTON & BILL RENO, PUBLIC POWER: THE FIGHT FOR PUBLICLY
OWNED ELECTRICITY 60 (2003).
44. GIANT POWER SURVEY, supra note 41, at v.
45. Jean Christie, Giant Power: A Progressive Proposal of the NineteenTwenties, 96 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 480, 486 (1972). “The greatest menace to
the national prosperity and general welfare of the United States . . . is the alarming
decline of American agriculture and the astounding migration from the farms to the
cities.” Id. (citing Basil Manly, a future appointee to the Federal Power Commission).
46. BROWN, supra note 2, at 3.
47. Id. at 3–12. The effort was led by the Committee on the Relation of
Electricity to Agriculture (“CREA”).
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Eventually, the effort to electrify rural America became wrapped up in
the great debate of private versus public power in the 1920s. Progressives
became increasingly skeptical of for-profit utilities, even after a system of
state rate-regulation became widely implemented.48 Progressives criticized
utility companies for seeking ever-greater returns on equity, for capture of
regulatory agencies, and for bribery of politicians.49 Groups like the National
Public Government League and Public Ownership League touted public
municipal ownership as the better alternative.
Meanwhile, progressives were developing a grand vision of hydropower
resource development that could also supply electricity to rural America, a
vision that was to become an important foundation of the New Deal.
Developing better electricity transmission and larger generators meant that for
the first time a network of electricity lines could bring power to large service
territories.50 Harnessing America’s water power resources could provide
flood control, economic development, and electricity to rural communities.51
The concept had already been proven in Ontario, Canada, where the publiclyowned Hydro-Electric Power Commission had built a dam at Niagara Falls
and was providing electricity to the province at cheaper rates than those in
America.52 The program included government subsidies for electrification of
rural Ontario.53
In the United States, Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot seized on
this vision in a plan called “Giant Power,” which proposed to develop a large,
interconnected grid that could electrify rural Pennsylvania.54 Pinchot’s team
hoped that Giant Power could create a “veritable ‘back to the land’
movement” and diffuse industrial development so that even small towns “are
on the same footing as large centers.”55

48. See infra Part I.B.
49. Id.
50. Christie, supra note 45, at 481 (“By 1920 engineers were learning how to
transmit high voltage current over distances of two hundred miles or more.”).
51. See HAMPTON & RENO, supra note 43, at 77.
52. Id. at 87, 92.
53. Id. Legislation providing “bonus” subsidies for the primary cost of
transmission to rural areas was passed in the early 1920s, more than a decade before
the REA. By the 1950s, however, the REA effort had surpassed Hydro Ontario in
providing power to rural communities. Id. at 51–66.
54. See Gifford Pinchot, Giant Power, 51 THE SURVEY 561 (1924).
Giant Power means giving to every producer of current an opportunity to add
to a common stock and to every user an opportunity to draw therefrom. Giant
Power mans the practice on the broadest possible scale of every possible
economy, such as the pooling of standby facilities and the elimination of every
waste, such as that due to a low power factor.

Id. Pinchot’s plan proposed this electrification without hydropower, but rather through
a system of that interconnected central generating stations that could make use of
Pennsylvania’s coal resources. Id.
55. Id. at 561–62. “[O]ur first concern will be with the small user – particularly
with the farmer.” Id.
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For-profit companies had their own vision of an interconnected
electricity system: “superpower.”56
Unlike Giant Power, however,
superpower did not include in its vision either greater public regulation or a
widespread rural electrification effort.57
As the debate of public versus private power intensified, the electricity
industry used aggressive tactics to prevent or buy out municipal public power
utilities – including “rate wars, buy-out campaigns, harassing litigation, and a
massive propaganda campaign.”58
This coincided with a period of rapid consolidation in the industry.
Through a series of mergers and consolidations under holding companies,
sixteen holding companies controlled 85% of the nation’s electricity by
1935.59 For-profit electricity companies also aggressively sold watered-down
stock to middle-Americans. Some of these holding companies imploded
during the Great Depression.60
For all of these reasons, electric power became a major issue during the
presidential election of 1932.61 In a speech delivered in Portland, Oregon,
Franklin D. Roosevelt argued that for-profit utilities were over-charging
customers by inflating capital costs and fleecing ordinary investors.62
Moreover, Roosevelt argued that for-profit utilities were also responsible for
the lack of rural electrification, saying that “many selfish interests in control
of light and power industries have not been sufficiently farsighted to establish
water rates low enough to encourage widespread public use.”63
Roosevelt called for federal regulation of holding companies.64 He also
argued that water power resources should be publicly owned – “should belong
56. See W.S. MURRAY, A Superpower System for the Region Between Boston and
Washington 9 (1921), http://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/pp123 [perma.cc/RFT68ATJ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). Superpower arose out of concerns that electricity
demands of industry on the eastern seaboard during World War I would outstrip
electricity supply. Congress subsequently commissioned a report on the development
of a “Superpower System” for the northeast. Id.
57. GIANT POWER SURVEY, supra note 41, at vii. “Giant Power and super-power
are as different as a tame elephant and a wild one . . . . The place for the public is on
the neck of the elephant, guiding its movements, not on the ground helpless under its
knees.” Id.
58. RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 34, at 47.
59. Id. at 46–47.
60. Id. at 60.
61. Id. at 62.
62. Address of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt (Sept. 21, 1932), in 1 FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT – “THE GREAT COMMUNICATOR”: THE MASTER SPEECH FILES, 1898,
1910–1945, File No. 518, at 7–12, available at https://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_res
ources/images/msf/msf00530.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id. at 16–17.
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to all the people . . . [and be] transferred into usable electrical energy and
distributed at the lowest possible cost.”65 In Roosevelt’s vision, federallyowned public power – along with local publicly-owned utilities – would serve
as a “birch rod” or “yard stick” that could be used as a measure to ensure that
private for-profit utility rates were fair.66 He also envisioned that these
federally-owned facilities would facilitate rural electrification.67

2. After Exhausting Other Options, the Roosevelt Administration
Settled on Cooperatives
After Roosevelt was elected in 1932, his Administration initially focused
on creating the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) and on taming the
holding companies.68 Behind the scenes, however, Morris Llewyln Cooke –
one of Roosevelt’s TVA Commissioners who had also previously directed
Pinchot’s Giant Power effort – lobbied the Administration to develop a rural
electrification plan.69 The National Grange and American Farm Bureau
Federation, the two leading agricultural civic organizations, also called for a
federal rural electrification program.70
Cooke’s ideas finally gained traction from the Administration when
pitched as a way to fulfill the jobs goals of the New Deal.71 In April of 1935,
Congress passed the Roosevelt Administration’s second major Depressionrelief appropriation.72 As part of the nearly $5 billion appropriation, the bill
earmarked $100 million for rural electrification.73 A month later, Roosevelt

65. Id. at 25.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id. at 27. “The power issue, when vigorously handled in the public interest,
means . . . reduced rates and increased use in millions of urban and rural homes.” Id.
68. BROWN, supra note 2, at 17–19. The focal point of the public vs. private
power debate in the 1920s was a half-completed damn of the Tennessee River at
Muscle Schoals in the Tennessee Valley. Id. Progressives argued that the government
should complete and own the damn; conservatives and industry were opposed to
government controlling such an economic interest. Id. Congress established TVA
through legislation in 1933. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58
(1933). After nine years of hearings, Congress passed the Public Utility Holding
Company Act in 1935, which subjected holding companies to regulation by both the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Power Commission
(FPC, subsequently renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)).
Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935).
69. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 26–29.
70. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 34, at 135–36.
71. Person, supra note 34, at 70 (“It should be emphasized that the REA was
established under conditions that made it one element in a general program of relief
of unemployment. This was the controlling factor in its initial activities.”).
72. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 34, at 137.
73. Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, ch. 48, 49 Stat. 115 (1935).
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created the REA through an executive order, tasking it with developing
“generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy in rural areas.”74
Roosevelt appointed Cooke as the first Administrator of the REA.
Although Cooke was a public power supporter, he believed that the skill and
expertise of for-profit utilities would be necessary to electrify rural America,
especially given the need to expend $100 million in a short time period.75
In response to Cooke’s entreaties, the for-profit utilities proposed a
limited plan that focused on providing electricity to large, energy-intensive
uses such as “dairying, irrigation, or poultry farming.”76 They did not see
small farmers and other rural residents as viable customers, even though early
rural electrification pilot projects demonstrated that individual households
would become significant consumers of electricity as they acquired electric
appliances.77 Moreover, the costs projected by the utilities were much higher
than those anticipated by the Administration.78 The utilities proposed
spending over $113 million to connect 351,000 rural customers,79 a far cry
from the New Deal vision of bringing electricity to all rural communities.
Cooke summed up the proposal as a deal where “the federal government
should risk its entire capital appropriation while the industry reaped the
profits.”80 Further negotiation with the for-profit utilities was shut down after
the companies squared off with the Administration over legislation that would
significantly restrict the holding company corporate structure used by most of
the companies at that time.81
Cooke also convened representatives of municipal public power utilities
to see if they could carry out rural electrification.82 The municipal utilities
raised concerns about cost, as well as legal and political issues.83
With for-profit utilities and municipal power companies dismissed as
possible solutions, the last remaining option was the cooperative model.
Farmers were already familiar with cooperatives as an organizational
model because of the prevalence of cooperatively-owned grain elevators and

74. Exec. Order No. 7,037, Establishing the Rural Electrification Administration
(1935), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/208659 [perma.cc/5F5W893X].
75. BROWN, supra note 2, at 48–49.
76. Id. at 50–51.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 55.
79. FUNIGIELLO, supra note 34, at 141.
80. Id. at 142.
81. BROWN, supra note 2, at 48–52.
82. Id. At 52.
83. Id.
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farm produce marketing cooperatives.84 In some European countries –
particularly Sweden – cooperatives had been used to electrify rural
communities.85
A small number of electric cooperatives were already functioning
successfully in the United States, chiefly in Iowa, Washington, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin.86 As part of the process of standing up TVA, the residents of
Alcorn County, Mississippi, established an electric cooperative to provide
distribution service to their poor agricultural county and its town of Corinth.87
Within six months, the Alcorn County Electric Cooperative proved to be
solvent.88 It served as an important example that farmers – even poor, onecrop farmers in the South – could use the cooperative model to electrify their
communities.89
When Cooke’s repeated efforts to encourage for-profit utilities to present
proposals for area coverage at reasonable cost bore no fruit, he resigned
himself to the cooperative as the model for rural electrification.90
Cooke also realized that achieving widespread electrification would
require making REA a permanent agency with additional funding. Cooke and
his Congressional allies achieved this result in 1936 with the passage of the
Rural Electrification Act (“RE Act”).91 The RE Act appropriated $410
million to the REA over a 10-year period to make loans for rural
electrification.92 The Act required that the REA administrator give preference
to public agencies and “cooperative . . . associations.”93
The vision of cooperatives embraced by the REA was based on
cooperative principles developed nearly 100 years earlier. The Rochdale
Society of Equitable Pioneers, a group of weavers and other tradespeople,
formed a consumer cooperative in England in 1844.94 The “Rochdale”

84. BROWN, supra note 2, at 53; HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE 120, 124–25 (1996). In 1935 the Division of Self-Help Cooperatives of
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration published a study of the suitability of
the cooperative model for rural electrification, and perhaps not too surprisingly, found
that cooperatives would be a viable model. UDO RALL, FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF
ADMINISTRATION, A STUDY OF COOPERATIVE CONSUMER ASSOCIATIONS FOR RURAL
ELECTRIFICATION (1935), available at https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/10168393
9 [perma.cc/3NP5-NT8H].
85. BROWN, supra note 2, at 16.
86. Id. at 13–14.
87. Id. at 36–37.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 38.
90. See id. at 55.
91. Id. at 56–57, 65.
92. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-605, § 3, 432 Stat. 1363,
1364 (1936).
93. Id. § 4, 432 Stat. at 1365.
94. See ISRAEL PACKEL, THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COOPERATIVES
4–5 (4th ed. 1970).
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principles still shape cooperatives around the world across all sectors of the
economy.95
As restated by the REA in its guidance documents, some of the key
Rochdale principles were as follows: (1) A cooperative’s membership is to be
open to all; (2) The cooperative is to be controlled democratically, with each
member receiving one vote; (3) Members receive equity in proportion to their
patronage (i.e., how much electricity they purchase); and (4) Members are not
to receive any profit on their equity investment, only interest.96
Although the REA initially was structured as a lender, by 1937 the
agency provided “engineering, management, legal, and financial” services to
help stand up cooperatives across the country.97 By 1939, the REA had
disbursed over $227 million in loans for rural electrification – predominantly
to newly formed electricity cooperatives – and had doubled the number of
farms with electricity.98

3. Faced with Continued Private Sector Opposition, Cooperatives
Banded Together to Build Power Plants and Transmission Lines
REA’s early leaders envisioned that the REA would focus on financing
and supporting electricity distribution cooperatives.99
The main
responsibilities of distribution cooperatives were to string power lines to
individual customers (i.e., member-owners) and to set up a system of
accounts.100 The distribution cooperatives were not responsible for generating
the electricity; instead they were to contract for wholesale power with forprofit utilities or the federal government and would similarly contract for
transmission service with for-profit utilities.101
In practice, however, the for-profit utilities frequently viewed
cooperatives as unwelcome competitors. Attempts by cooperatives to
contract with these utilities often proved acrimonious, and cooperatives
complained about rates they were offered.102

95. Jeter et al., supra note 3, at 385–86.
96. Id. For a history of how cooperative principles have been updated over time
by the International Cooperative Alliance, see Ann Hoyt, Cooperative Principles
Updated, COOPERATIVE GROCER NETWORK (1996), https://www.grocer.coop/articles/
cooperative-principles-updated [perma.cc/8TFA-JZDV] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
97. RONALD R. KLINE, CONSUMERS IN THE COUNTRY: TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN RURAL AMERICA 145–151 (2000).
98. Kitchens & Fishback, supra note 2, at 1162.
99. BROWN, supra note 2, at 91.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 91–92.
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At the same time, Congress was authorizing the development of federal
multi-use dams throughout the country that would provide additional sources
of hydroelectric power.103 Many dams were constructed for irrigation or flood
control purposes, but also generated electricity.104 Since the early 1900s,
Congress had consistently required that these federal dams give preference to
public entities when disposing of any “surplus” electricity.105 Congress
included non-profit cooperatives among the preferred customers of federal
hydropower facilities, including in the TVA Act, the Bonneville Project Act
of 1937, and the Flood Control Act of 1944.106 This opened the door for a
slew of new power sources for distribution cooperatives.
Cooperatives sought a means to get power from these new dams to their
service territories.107 Since they could not rely on for-profit utilities to offer
them transmission at reasonable rates, electricity distribution cooperatives
began to band together to form “Generation and Transmission” or power
supply cooperatives.108 Some also sought to build their own power plants.
The RE Act specifically authorized the REA to provide loans not only
for electricity distribution service, but also for “the construction and operation
of generating plants” and “transmission . . . lines.”109 The REA began using
this authority to finance power plants and transmission lines in 1936 and, in
1938, approved its first loan to a power supply cooperative in Wisconsin.110

103. Id.
104. Id. at 99–100.
105. See generally Eric Redman, Preference and Other Clauses in Federal Power
Marketing Acts, 13 ENVTL. L. 773 (1982); Jeffrey C. Fereday, Comment, The Meaning
of the Preference Clause in Hydroelectric Power Allocation under the Federal
Reclamation Statutes, 9 ENVTL. L. 601 (1978).
106. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 5, 58 Stat. 887, 890 (1944);
Bonneville Project Act, Pub. L. No. 75-329, § 4, 50 Stat. 731, 733 (1937); Tennessee
Valley Authority Act, § 10, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (1933).
107. BROWN, supra note 2, at 17–19.
108. RICHARD A. PENCE & PATRICK. DAHL, THE NEXT GREATEST THING: FIFTY
YEARS OF ELECTRIFICATION 182 (1984).
109. Rural Electrification Act, Pub. L. No. 74-605 § 3(a), 49 Stat. 1363, 1364
(1936).
110. DONALD H. COOPER, RURAL ELECTRIC FACTS; AMERICAN SUCCESS STORY 70
(1970). The old guard leadership of the REA was skeptical that cooperatives should
be in the power supply business. BROWN, supra note 2, at 91. This set up a fight with
the newly formed National Rural Electricity Cooperative Association (“NRECA”),
which lobbied aggressively for such loans. Id. at 85. In 1941 the then-REA
Administrator Harry Slattery opposed a loan to the Brazos River Generating and
Transmission Cooperative. Id. at 91–92. The Brazos power supply cooperative was
formed by 11 distribution cooperatives in Texas that were dissatisfied with utility
wholesale power rates. Id. The collective applied for REA financing to build
transmission that would enable them to procure power from the federal Possum
Kingdom hydroelectric power plant. Id. NRECA and its allies ultimately succeeded
in having the loan approved, and the issue contributed to Slattery’s eventual
resignation in 1944. Id. at 92–94. The high-profile fight opened the door to further
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The REA was making rapid progress standing up distribution
cooperatives and bringing electricity to rural farms. By 1963, over 97% of
farms in the United States had electricity service, with approximately half
being served by cooperatives and other REA borrowers.111 But rural retail
electricity rates offered by cooperatives were still high, 15% to 20% higher
than those in cities.112 The cost of wholesale power and transmission service
procured from for-profit utilities was a major factor behind those high rates.
In 1963, 38% of the power supplied to cooperatives came from for-profit
utilities.113 Power purchased from those for-profit utilities was substantially
more expensive than power from federal entities.114 For these reasons, after
1944 the REA increasingly focused on lowering the cost of rural power by
financing generation and transmission.115
For-profit utilities bitterly opposed both the federal power purchase
preferences for cooperatives as well as REA’s willingness to finance
generation and transmission projects. They viewed these actions as
government-subsidized competition to their business model.116
The private-sector utilities brought several rounds of legal challenges to
both the federal power purchase preferences and to the REA’s financing of
cooperative-owned generation and transmission resources, and they brought
similar cases against municipal utilities.117 The utilities claimed that the
federal government exceeded its authority with these preferences and loans,
among other claims.118 In 1938, one of the municipal cases reached the
Supreme Court. In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, the Court held that where a
utility has a non-exclusive franchise, a utility’s loss of business as a result of
competition from federally-financed municipal power plants was not a legal
loans to REA power supply cooperatives, and REA’s subsequent leadership was
committed to financing power supply cooperatives. Id. at 91–92, 101–113.
111. Agricultural Appropriations for 1963: Hearing on H.R.12648 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 88th Cong. 2406 (1962) (statement of
Norman M. Clapp, Administrator, Rural Electrification Administration) [hereinafter
1963 REA Appropriation Hearing].
112. Id. at 2466–68.
113. Id. Another 39% came from federal power sources such as TVA or federal
power marketing agencies, 7% from other public agencies like municipalities, and
16% was generated by REA-financed resources. Id. at 2465.
114. COOPER, supra note 110, at 70–71.
115. For example, in 1962, 59% of loans were used for generation and
transmission facilities. 1963 REA Appropriation Hearing, supra note 110, at 2409.
116. BROWN, supra note 2, at 101–13.
117. Id. at 101–13.
118. Other causes of action were that the actions represented a taking of the
utilities’ business and that the actions represented a monopolistic conspiracy between
the federal government and cooperatives in violation of anti-trust laws. See infra notes
119, 120.
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injury sufficient to grant standing.119 Federal appellate courts eventually
applied this precedent to dismiss utility challenges to REA generation and
transmission loans, with the leading case being the D.C. Circuit’s 1955
decision in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay.120
In 1961, the REA expanded the circumstances under which it would
finance generation and transmission. The RE Act limited the REA’s authority
to financing facilities that would provide electricity to areas “not receiving
central station service.”121 Previously, the REA had financed power plants
and transmission lines where there was no service available.122 Under the new
policy, the REA would also finance these facilities in situations where rates
offered by for-profit utilities to cooperatives were higher than those that would
result from REA financing and also where “generation and transmission
facilities are necessary to protect the security and effectiveness of REAfinanced systems.”123 The REA justified this expansion as being in keeping
with its “responsibility to assist borrowers in achieving the most advantageous
power supply arrangements.”124
Despite the opposition of for-profit utilities – and largely because of their
unreasonable wholesale pricing – the REA went on to finance a substantial
number of generation and transmission facilities.125 In fact, the majority of

119. Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1938); see also Tenn. Elec.
Power Co. v. Tenn. Val. Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939), abrogated by Bond v.
United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011) (holding utilities challenging federal Tennessee
Valley Authority generation and sale of wholesale power did not have exclusive state
franchise and therefore loss of business from lawful competition was not sufficient for
standing).
120. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 933 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); see also Rural Electrification Admin. v. N.
States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1967); Rural Electrification Admin. v.
Cent. La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1966).
121. Rural Electrification Act, 74 Pub. L. 605, § 2, 49 Stat. 1363 (1936).
122. Id.
123. REA Bulletin 20-6 (May 31, 1961), reprinted in 29 Fed. Reg. 2765, 2766
(Feb. 27, 1964).
124. Id. at 2765.
125. 1963 REA Appropriation Hearing, supra note 111, at 2606–07. For-profit
utilities complained to Congress about what they viewed as a further incursion into
their territory. Id. Congress prodded REA on whether the agency was going beyond
its authority. The REA subsequently agreed to conduct a “power supply survey” prior
to issuing any further loans for generation and transmission facilities. Rural
Electrification Administration Power Supply Surveys, 29 Fed. Reg. 2765, 2766 (Feb.
27, 1964). Where contracts existed, the REA said it would only grant financing where
existing contracts were “unreasonable” and after utilities had been given an
opportunity to bring rates down to a reasonable level. Id. For-profit utilities saw a
chance to use this new survey requirement as a procedural hook to attain standing to
challenge these loans. Id. The courts, however, did not find that the policy created
any new procedural right, and these new challenges were also dismissed. See, e.g.,
Ala. Power Co. v. Ala. Elec. Co-op., Inc., 394 F.2d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 1968); Rural
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loans originated over the lifetime of the federal rural electrification program
have funded generation and transmission facilities.126
Today, there are 62 power supply cooperatives. Cooperatives –
including both power supply and distribution cooperatives – generate 5% of
total electricity produced in the United States.127

B. Coops Are Largely Exempted from Utility Regulation
The electric power sector is one of the most heavily regulated industries
in the United States. Rural electricity cooperatives, however, are largely
either exempted from state and federal economic regulations or subjected to
less scrutiny. To understand why cooperatives have lagged behind in the
transition to a lower-carbon electricity system, it is important to first
understand how the system of electric utility regulation evolved and why
cooperatives were exempted.
This Part first describes how state and federal economic regulation of
utilities developed in response to the emergence of utility monopolies. It also
describes how regulation expanded to include resource planning requirements
in the 1980s and how in some markets, several states and the federal
government replaced regulation with competition. It then describes how
cooperatives were largely exempted from these state and federal regulations
because they lacked a profit-motive and were therefore seen as self-regulating.

1. States and the Federal Government Develop a State-Federal
Regulated Monopoly Model
The structure of the U.S. model of electricity regulation developed in
response to technology advances that changed the industry from small,
competitive municipal utilities to consolidated monopolies serving large
geographic areas. In response to this change, states first developed a model
of utility commission regulation, and the federal government then exerted its
authority over sales of wholesale electricity and interstate transmission.
At the end of the 19th Century, most for-profit electric utilities served
urban areas and operated under municipal franchises.128 Municipal oversight

Electrification Admin. v. N. States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686, 696 (8th Cir. 1967);
Rural Electrification Admin. v. Cent. La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966).
126. Compare $56.9 billion in long term financing approved to distribution
cooperatives with $72.3 billion approved to generation and transmission cooperatives.
RURAL UTILITIES SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2011 STATISTICAL REPORT: RURAL
ELECTRIC BORROWERS 8 (2011).
127. Nat’l Rural Electric Cooperative Ass’n, supra note 10.
128. Thomas P. Lyon & Nathan Wilson, Capture or Contract? The Early Years of
Electric Utility Regulation, 42 J. REG. ECON. 225, 227 (2012).
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initially made sense because the direct current technology of the time limited
electricity distribution to a small radius around the generating station.129
Generating stations were therefore located in cities and served a small
surrounding area.130 Utilities needed municipal authority to access public
streets to string wires.131
The resulting municipal franchises took form as long-term contracts that
authorized utilities to operate in a city and “dig up streets” and usually
imposed price ceilings and minimal service thresholds.132 Most cities
awarded multiple franchises under the theory that competition should lead to
lower prices.133
The municipal franchise model quickly revealed its weaknesses. Rapid
technology improvements caused the price of electricity delivery to fall
quickly, rendering the price ceilings that had been written into long-term
contracts useless.134 Corruption was a major problem, with politicians
demanding bribes for the award of franchises and favorable franchise terms
or for forgoing the award of franchises to competitors.135
In addition, while most cities awarded multiple franchises, few
companies were able to survive competition in such a capital-intensive
industry.136 By 1910, few cities had any meaningful utility competition,137
leaving the surviving for-profit utilities in a monopolistic market position with
the ability to charge customers monopoly prices and to use discriminatory
pricing.138

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Franchise contract terms were typically 20 to 50 years. Werner Troesken,
Regime Change and Corruption: A History of Public Utility Regulation, in
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY, 260
(Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Golden eds., 2006).
133. RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 34, at 31 (“nearly every city in the country
had granted several . . . franchises to competing electric companies”); but see
Troesken, supra note 132, at 261 (stating that “most markets were not sufficiently
large to support competition”).
134. Troesken, supra note 132, at 260–261.
135. JOHN L. NEUFELD, SELLING POWER: ECONOMICS, POLICY, AND ELECTRIC
UTILITIES BEFORE 1940, 49–53 (2016); see also Troesken, supra note 132, at 268–69.
136. NEUFELD, supra note 135, at 48–49.
137. Id. at 48–49.
138. Id. In the absence of competition, monopolies have absolute power to set
prices, and can set prices in a way that generates maximum profit irrespective of the
marginal cost of producing the product. Similarly, monopolies can further increase
profits by setting different prices for different customers not tied to the marginal cost
of producing the product.
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These factors led progressives and other reformers to seek alternatives
to municipal franchise regulation of for-profit utilities. Many called for public
municipal ownership of utilities.139
At the same time, J.P. Morgan and other wealth financiers were buying
up municipal for-profit utilities and consolidating them under large holding
companies.140 One reason for this shift was technological improvements that
allowed for longer distance delivery of electricity, making possible new
economies of scale for larger systems.141
As a result, the for-profit electric industry changed from a universe of
many competitive municipal utilities into a universe of large, consolidated
utilities with monopoly power in their service territories.142
In 1898, Samuel Insull, then-President of Chicago Edison and of the
National Electric Light Association (the electric power trade association),
called on his colleagues in the industry to support shifting to a regulated
monopoly model.143 Despite initial opposition from his fellow industry
executives, he argued that a system of regulated monopolies would protect
for-profit utilities from disastrous competition and from the threat of
municipal takeovers urged by public-power proponents.144
In 1907 progressive reformers and for-profit utility leaders both agreed
that a new regulatory model was necessary in a major report commissioned

139. Id. at 52–53. “Many progressives regarded the municipal ownership of
utilities as a solution to the corruption problem.” Id. at 52.
140. See RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 34, at 60.
141. Christie, supra note 45, at 481.
142. RUDOLPH & RIDLEY, supra note 34, at 46–47.
143. Forrest McDonald, Samuel Insull and the Movement for State Utility
Regulatory Commissions, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 241, 242 (1958).
144. Id. Insull highlighted the perils of competition in the utility industry, noting
that competition spooked investors and therefore forced utilities to “pay a very high
price for capital,” and that when competitors are inevitably acquired, the surviving
utility is saddled with duplicate infrastructure and high debt. SAMUEL INSULL, PUBLIC
CONTROL AND PRIVATE OPERATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE 8 (1899). Neufeld adds that
Insull’s turn towards support for state regulated monopoly came after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smyth v. Ames. NEUFELD, supra note 135, at 61. In that case, the
court affirmed that states have the power to set rates for in-state railroad travel and
identified a convoluted set of factors that states would need to follow to ensure that
rates were not so low as to amount to a taking under the 14th Amendment of the
Constitution. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1876) (affirming constitutionality of state laws setting rates for private businesses
“affected with a public interest”); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(clarifying that legislatures, not courts, determine whether rate regulation required by
public interest for any business, and holding that courts are without authority to
override such determinations).
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by the National Civic Federation.145 The near-consensus report found that
“public utilities are so constituted that it is impossible for them to be regulated
by competition.”146 Instead, “utilities whether in public or private hands, are
best conducted under a system of legalized and regulated monopoly” and
“private companies operating public utilities should be subject to public
regulation and examination.”147
After the issuance of the report, Wisconsin and New York adopted utility
commissions in 1907.148 The commission model, borrowed from the
railroads,149 reflected a progressive belief in scientific management, where
rate regulation would be in the hands of “expert, nonpolitical state
commissions.”150 The overall goal of these regulations was to “fix rates at a
level that would prevent economic coercion and balance the needs of investors
and ratepayers.”151 By 1930, all but one state had established public utility
commissions charged with regulating monopoly utility franchises to ensure
just and reasonable rates and non-discriminatory provision of service.152
As electricity systems grew in size, interstate transfers of electricity
became more common, raising the question of what entity would regulate
these interstate activities.153 In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibited state utility commissions from

145. See Municipal and Private Operation of Public Utilities Before Comm. on
Public Ownership and Operation, NAT’L CIVIC FEDERATION (1907); RUDOLPH &
RIDLEY, supra note 34, at 35–40.
146. Municipal and Private Operation of Public Utilities Before Comm. on Public
Ownership and Operation, supra 145, at 23.
147. Id. at 26. As William Boyd notes, “There is a diverse literature on the origins
of public utility regulation, with strong competing explanations between those
advancing a public interest theory or regulation and those arguing for a public choice
explanation, which held that regulated entities actively sought regulation and used it
for their benefit.” William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of
Economic Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 755 n.135 (2018).
148. Id. at 755. John Commons, the lead author of the Wisconsin legislation and
a progressive, was an author of the Civic Federation Commission report and attributed
the bill’s structure to the report. See JOHN R. COMMONS, MYSELF (1934). “I adopted
nearly the whole of the recommendations . . . of the investigating committee of the
Civic Federation.” Id. at 120.
149. Id. at 755 n.135.
150. McDonald, supra note 143, at 244.
151. Boyd, supra note 147, at 756. Key features of the Wisconsin model – now
common in utility regulation – included “mandatory universal service, protected local
franchises, delegated powers of eminent domain, a cost-based ‘used and useful’
standard for valuing assets as part of rate base, a uniform system of accounting,
commission powers of investigation and adjudication, and, most importantly, a
requirement that utility rates be ‘reasonable and just.’” Id.
152. Id. at 755. Delaware was the lone holdout. Id.
153. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83
(1927), abrogated by Ark. Elec. Co-op. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375
(1983).
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regulating these transfers,154 creating a “gap” in regulation.155 Congress filled
this gap in 1935 with the Federal Power Act, which authorized the Federal
Power Commission (“FPC”) to regulate interstate transmission of electricity
and wholesale sales of electricity.156 The Act explicitly preserved states’
“jurisdiction over the planning and siting of generation infrastructure and
ratemaking for retail sales of electricity and use of local distribution
systems.”157
During the middle decades of the 20th century, the state utility
commission model worked fairly well as utilities built larger power plants to
capture economies of scale and meet increasing demand. Electricity rates
generally declined.158 But beginning in the 1970s, these happy times ended
as the energy crisis spiked fuel costs; there were no more efficiencies from
economies of scale to be had, and a nuclear building boom spun out of control
due to cost increases.159
As a result of rapid rate increases and spate of abandoned nuclear
projects, two important trends emerged. First, state utility commissions
recognized that utilities needed more formalized oversight for long-term
resource planning and introduced the integrated resource plan (“IRP”)
requirement.160 IRPs require utilities to forecast future loads, identify
potential resource options (e.g., power plants or energy efficiency measures)
to meet those loads, and analyze what set of resources will create the optimal,
lowest cost mix for meeting those requirements.161 Congress then passed the
1992 Energy Policy Act, which required that each state utility commission
consider adopting an IRP mandate.162 In 2011, FERC’s Order 1000
established somewhat similar requirements for interstate transmission

154. Id. at 89.
155. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 824 (2016).
156. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, §201(b), 74 Stat. 803, 847–48 (1935 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2018)).
157. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 155, at 824.
158. See generally id. at 828–30.
159. Id. at 828–32.
160. CHERYL HARRINGTON ET AL., INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING FOR STATE
UTILITY REGULATORS 5–7 (1994); cf. Boyd, supra note 31, at 1693 (asserting that
although IRPs formalized resource planning, such planning “has long been at the heart
of traditional utility regulation”).
161. RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING: EXAMPLES
OF
STATE REGULATIONS AND RECENT UTILITY PLANS 4 (2013),
https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rapsynapse-wilsonbiewaldbestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf [perma.cc/VRG4-D78H].
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(c)–(d) (2018); see also § 2602(19) (defining IRP).
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planning where utilities are required to take into account public policy
objectives such as renewables mandates.163
Second, the crisis fomented critiques of the regulated monopoly model
and increased interest in moving to a competitive market framework. An
earlier law, the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (“PURPA”), had already
created a mechanism that demonstrated that under the right circumstances,
small, renewable energy producers could successfully compete against large,
incumbent utilities.164 Several states and the federal government introduced
regulatory changes to promote competition or “deregulate” the sector. At the
federal level, FERC mandated open access to transmission, required utilities
to “unbundle” generation and transmission services, and encouraged the
development of competitive wholesale electricity markets.165 Sixteen states
implemented changes allowing retail customers to choose retail service
providers, creating a competitive retail market.166
There are now three different models of electricity regulation, as
characterized by William Boyd and Anne Carlson.167 In the Southeast and
much of the West, the traditional regulated monopoly model remains
dominant, and there are no organized wholesale electricity markets.168 The
competitive model prevails in Texas, much of the northeast, and some of the
Midwest, where states authorize retail competition and there are organized
wholesale markets.169 The remaining areas operate under a mix of the two,
with organized wholesale markets but traditional monopoly regulation at the
retail level.170 Cooperatives operate in all three types of regulatory models.171

2. The REA Viewed Itself as Cooperative Overseer and Urged States
and the Federal Government to Avoid Additional Regulation
The state-federal regulatory structure described above developed to
protect consumers from exploitative pricing imposed by profit-seeking
corporations. Cooperatives, on the other hand, were by definition – and by
163. Boyd, supra note 31, at 1696–97.
164. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2018); Boyd, supra note 31, at 1675. PURPA requires
that utilities allow small renewable and alternative energy “qualifying facilities” to
interconnect into the electricity grid and requires the utilities to purchase the power at
avoided cost. §§ 824a-3 (a), (b), and (e); 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a). See generally
RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (2001) (describing
how PURPA demonstrated that competition could work in the electricity sector).
165. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar.
14, 1997).
166. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 155, at 833.
167. Id. at 835–39.
168. Id. at 835.
169. Id. at 837–38.
170. Id. at 838–39.
171. Id. at 830–36.
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law – not-for-profit organizations. Their early proponents saw little reason
that these member-owned not-for-profits should be regulated as for-profit
corporations. The REA therefore advocated for minimal state regulation by
developing model state laws that were widely adopted.172 The agency was
also successful in advocating that the FPC disclaim federal regulatory
authority over the sale of wholesale power and interstate transmission service
by power supply cooperatives.173 The REA itself did exercise some quasiregulatory authority over cooperatives in its role as a lender, but this oversight
role was limited and has diminished over time.174
Electricity cooperatives were a novel concept in most states, and they
needed legal authorization as corporate entities and utilities under state law.
The federal Public Works Administration and later the REA issued several
versions of model state laws that would authorize electricity cooperatives.175
The model legislation provided broad powers to the cooperatives to engage in
rural electrification, including the generation, transmission, and distribution
of electricity to their members.176 The laws also granted cooperatives the
authority to exercise eminent domain.
Consistent with the Rochdale principles, the model acts reflected a
strong commitment to democratic control of the cooperative.177 The model
acts provided that cooperatives were to be governed under a one-member,
one-vote principle.178 The default for a quorum was set at a very low 5% of
membership “in order to insure workability in practice.”179 Although the
model laws called for governance by an elected board of trustees, they also
included a more direct member control mechanism to “safeguard the
democratic principle” by allowing members to “call special meetings and to
initiate changes by petition.”180
The model acts specifically exempted cooperatives “from the
jurisdiction and control of the public service commission of the state.”181 In
its 1939 model act, the REA said that this was “based upon the experience of

172. Richard P. Keck, Reevaluating the Rural Electrification Administration: A
New Deal for the Taxpayer, 16 ENVTL. L. 39, 47– 48 (1985).
173. Id. at 48.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 46 n.42.
176. Id.
177. See PACKEL, supra note 94, at 2 (defining cooperative in part to provide “for
substantial equality in ownership and control”).
178. The model rules allowed for “joint membership of husband and wife in order
to permit election of women to [the] board of trustees.” RURAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION, A DRAFT OF A RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ACT 3–4 (1939).
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id.
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the [REA] in meeting cooperative problems.”182 Israel Packel, a former REA
lawyer who went on to author an authoritative book on cooperative
organizations under U.S. law, argued that exemption from regulation was
appropriate because cooperatives do not serve the public at large, but rather
enter into a “special relationship” among their members “aimed at equality in
ownership and in control.”183
Even in states that did not pass legislation explicitly exempting
cooperatives from utility commission regulation, courts in early years often
found that utility commission authority did not extend to cooperatives absent
express language to the contrary.184 State legislation that enabled utility
commissions frequently authorized these commissions to regulate electric
utilities that were providing a “public” service.185 A number of state courts
found that this did not apply to cooperatives because a member-based
cooperative model was chiefly providing service to its own members, not to
the public at large.186
Recent scholarship confirms that states generally exempt cooperatives
from full rate regulation:
Only seven states (Arizona, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
New York, and Vermont) allow full regulation of co-op rates. Six
(Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, Virginia, and West
Virginia) allow streamlined or less stringent regulation than faced by
IOUs, and the rest of the states either make rate regulation optional to
the co-op or disallow it entirely.187

In addition to advocating that states eschew regulation of cooperatives,
the REA similarly advocated that power supply cooperatives be exempted
from federal FPC regulation. By definition, power supply cooperatives
182. Id. at 5. The model Act also exempted cooperatives from regulation of the
issue of securities by the state and exempted cooperatives from state excise taxes (in
return for a member-based annual fee to be paid to the state). Id. at 27. From its initial
enactment, the Rural Electrification Act did require that “no loan for the construction,
operation, or enlargement of any generating plant shall be made unless the consent of
the State authority having jurisdiction in the premises is first obtained.” Id. This
provision, however, has been chiefly concerned with the regulation of siting of
electricity infrastructure, not with regulation over rates.
183. PACKEL, supra note 94, at 281; see also Israel Packel, Commission
Jurisdiction over Utility Cooperatives, 35 MICH. L. REV. 411, 431 (1936).
184. Packel, supra note 183, at 413.
185. Id. at 412–13.
186. Id. at 414 (citing cases in highest courts of California, Illinois, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).
187. Cooper, supra note 33, at 342 n.53. In a 1990 rulemaking, REA reported that
45 of 66 power supply borrowers were not subject to rate regulation. Federal Preemption in Rate Making in Connection with Power Supply Borrowers, 55 Fed. Reg.
38,638, 38,642 (Sep. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Rate Making Preemption Rule].
Similarly, only 293 out of over 600 distribution cooperatives were subject to rate
regulation at that time. Id. at 38,644.
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engage in the sale of wholesale electricity, and they often provide interstate
transmission services. The Federal Power Act gave the FPC jurisdiction over
“public utilities” engaged in both of these activities.188 From the passage of
the FPA until the 1960s, however, the FPC did not regulate power supply
cooperatives and the issue was not formally considered by the FPC.
In 1963, the FPC initiated a proceeding sua sponte to determine whether
power supply cooperatives should be subject to its regulatory jurisdiction.189
Distribution cooperatives in Colorado also petitioned the FPC to assert
jurisdiction over their power supply cooperative to supersede a Colorado
Supreme Court decision barring construction of a new power plant.190 The
FPC resolved the issue in Dairyland Power Cooperative, where the agency
determined that it did not have jurisdiction over power supply cooperatives
because “cooperatives financed by REA are not public utilities within the
meaning of Part II of the Federal Power Act” and that “Congress never
intended this Commission to regulate cooperatives under the Federal Power
Act.”191
The FPC reasoned in part that Congress’s chief animus for passing the
FPA was to tame the for-profit utility holding companies, including by
subjecting them to FPC regulation.192 But cooperatives were not part of the
holding company problem. Indeed, Congress chose to explicitly exempt
“federal instrumentalities” from FPC jurisdiction in Sec. 201 (f) of the Federal
Power Act. The FPC reasoned that when Congress enacted the RE Act the
year after the FPA was passed, it made cooperatives “the instrumentalities
chosen by Congress for the purpose of bringing abundant, low cost electric
energy to rural America,” and therefore did not intend for them to be regulated
by the FPC.193 Although the FPC interpreted the law to deny it the authority
to regulate power supply cooperatives, it also argued that it would be in the
public interest for the FPC to have such authority over “major generating and
transmission cooperatives in interstate commerce.”194 The FPC argued that
such authority would be appropriate because power supply cooperatives

188. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 74 Stat. 803, 848 (1935) (codified as amended
16 U.S.C. § 824).
189. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C. 12, 15, 26 (F.P.C. 1967).
190. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 391 F.2d
470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 857 (1968).
191. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C. at 15.
192. Id. at 16.
193. Id. at 18; see also Federal Power Act, ch. 687, § 201(f), 74 Stat. 803, 848
(1935) (“No provision in this Part shall apply to, or be deemed to include, the United
States, a State or any political subdivision of a State, or any agency, authority, or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing . . . .”).
194. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C. at 28.
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transacted regularly with for-profit utilities and “have become an important
segment of the interstate electricity industry.”195
The FPC’s Dairyland decision was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals the following year.196 In 2005, Congress codified this result by
amending the Federal Power Act to expressly exempt from FPC jurisdiction
“an electric cooperative that receives financing under the Rural Electrification
Act . . . or that sells less than 4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per
year.”197 The amendment also exempted electric cooperatives “wholly
owned, directly or indirectly” by exempted entities, which includes power
supply cooperatives wholly owned by exempted distribution cooperatives.198
One of the other rationales the FPC relied on in disclaiming jurisdiction
was that the REA was already exercising a significant quasi-regulatory role
over both distribution and power supply cooperatives, including some
oversight of rates.199 Over time, however, the level of this oversight has
diminished, and courts have questioned whether the oversight provided by
REA/RUS was sufficient to protect the interest of cooperative members.
The REA/RUS has always required that its cooperative borrowers gain
the service’s approval on loan contracts, security instruments, and the
wholesale power contracts between power supply cooperatives and their
distribution cooperative.200 At the time of the Dairyland ruling, the REA also
required that a cooperative secure approval of their “manager, engineer, and
counsel; of its construction contracts and contracts for purchase of materials,
equipment, and supplies; of its contracts for purchase and sale of power; of its
insurance coverage; [and] its purchase of land.”201
The REA/RUS oversight mechanisms have included some constraints
on rate setting. For example, the RUS requires that the wholesale contract
that power supply cooperatives enter into with distribution cooperatives set
wholesale rates at levels “sufficient, but only sufficient, to meet the power
supply borrower’s costs, including repayment of [RUS] loans.”202 This

195. Id.
196. Salt River Project Agr. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Fed. Power Comm’n,
391 F.2d 470, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
197. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, 985 (2005)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(f)).
198. Id. at § 824(f).
199. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F.P.C. at 20–22; see also Salt River
Project, 391 F.2d at 476.
200. See Rate Making Preemption Rule, supra note 187, at 38,640.
201. Salt River Project, 391 F.2d at 473; see also Federal Pre-emption in Rate
Making in Connection with Power Supply Borrowers, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,194, 12,195
(proposed Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Proposed Rate Making Preemption Rule]; see
generally 7 C.F.R. § 1717.600 (2020).
202. Rate Making Preemption Rule, supra note 187, at 38,640. The REA
recognized, however, that “this wholesale power contract provision does not, of
course, ensure that the rates charged for electric power and energy by REA-financed
electric systems will not be higher than rates charged-by other utilities for similar
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provision is meant to first ensure that RUS loans will be repaid by having rates
set high enough to cover the debt payments.203 But it is also intended to keep
rates “as low as practicable” in keeping with RUS’s mission to provide lowcost electricity service to rural America.204
The nature and type of these oversight controls have varied over the
years.205 In 1995, RUS limited many of these “operational controls,”206 for
example, by automatically granting approval of a new general manager if a
borrower is otherwise in compliance with its loan provisions.207
Even when the oversight policies were more robust, courts and others
noted that REA/RUS oversight has not always been as thorough as other
regulatory agencies, for example FERC.208 As one commentator noted, the
REA/RUS has been “more cheerleader than critic.”209 Importantly, RUS
oversight also does not apply to former borrowers that have paid off their
loans. Several cooperatives, like Tri-State, no longer hold any RUS debt.
Recent court cases have also raised questions about the extent of RUS’s
authority to impose regulatory requirements, at least to the degree that RUS
claims these requirements can preempt state law.
In Arkansas Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1983 that the RE Act allowed for state rate
regulation of cooperatives concurrently with the REA’s quasi-regulatory
requirements as a lending agency.210 In that case, an Arkansas power supply
cooperative challenged the Arkansas state utility commission’s assertion of
jurisdiction over the wholesale electricity rates it charged its distribution

service. Indeed, historically, rates of REA borrowers have been higher than rates of
other utilities.” Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See e.g., Person, supra note 34, at 14 (describing how visits, audits,
inspections declined after 1945).
206. Loan Policies and Security Documents for Electric Borrowers, 60 Fed. Reg.
67,396 (Dec. 29, 1995).
207. 7 C.F.R. § 1717.609 (2020).
208. See, e.g., Ark. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375,
387 n.12 (1983) (“How well this oversight works in practice may be another matter
. . . . As the United States admits in its brief, ‘the REA does not control the rates and
rate structure of . . . generation and transmission associations as thoroughly or with
the formality of the Federal Power Commission.’”); but see Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 391 F.2d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (“REA regulation and supervision of cooperatives are, in many respects, far
more comprehensive than those which the Federal Power Commission exercises over
investor-owned utilities.”).
209. Cooper, supra note 33, at 343.
210. Ark. Elec. Coop., 461 U.S. at 377.
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cooperative members.211 The Court held that the RE Act did not preempt the
Arkansas Public Service Commission from regulating the rates of the AECC,
in part because the REA’s implementing regulations expressly required
cooperatives to seek any required state PUC approvals prior to submitting a
rate change to the REA.212 In other words, the REA’s own regulations
contemplated that REA rate-related contract conditions could overlap with
state jurisdiction over rates.213 The Court held open, however, the possibility
that the RE Act could preempt state regulation if the REA changed its policies
in a way authorized by the RE Act, or if a particular rate “compromise[d]
important federal interests, including the ability of the AECC to repay its
loans.”214
This issue came to the fore in the late 1980s after the REA authorized
several large loan guarantees that would allow power supply cooperatives to
gain ownership shares in new nuclear power plants. These power plants
experienced cost overruns, and in one case, construction of the plant was
abandoned.215 In Louisiana and Indiana, state utility commissions found that
power supply wholesale rates established to pay off these large loans were not
“just and reasonable” under traditional ratemaking principles requiring
investments to be “prudent” and “used and useful.”216
Seizing on the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Arkansas Elec. Co-op. that
state regulation could be pre-empted given the right circumstances, the REA
in 1990 promulgated regulations explicitly giving itself the authority to
211. Id.
212. Id. at 387–88.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 389. The Court also dismissed a dormant Commerce Clause challenge
claiming that under the Attleboro Steam precedent, the state could not regulate rates
for wholesale sales of electricity. Id. at 393. But the Supreme Court declined to apply
the bright line rule from Attleboro Steam, pointing to the evolution of its dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the past 50 years. Id. Instead, the Court applied
the balancing test it had recently articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137
(1970). Id. at 394. Under that test, state statutes that do not facially discriminate
against interstate commerce and have a legitimate local public interest are to be upheld
“unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.” Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142. The Court found no facial
discrimination and a legitimate public purpose, and found further that any effects on
interstate commerce resulting from the regulation of AECC’s wholesale rates would
be incidental. Ark. Elec. Coop., 461 U.S. at 394. At the same time, however, the Court
noted that AECC’s power generation facilities were all within the state and it served
exclusively in-state distribution cooperatives. Id. at 394–95. The Court analogized
that for the purposes of the Commerce Clause analysis, this particular power supply
cooperative was more akin to a distribution utility than a multi-state wholesale power
generator. Id. at 395.
215. William E. Schmidt, Rural Electric Co-ops Fight to Keep Subsidy, THE N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1984, at A16.
216. Matter of Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 109 F.3d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1997);
see Wabash Valley Power Ass’n v. Rural Electrification Admin., 988 F.2d 1480, 1482
(7th Cir. 1993).
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preempt state rate regulation of power supply cooperatives in circumstances
where states disapprove rates necessary to make payments on federal loans.217
The REA then sought to use this preemption authority to override the state
utility commission orders in Louisiana and Indiana and impose rates sufficient
to recoup its loans. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits were not impressed, however, and both courts invalidated the REA’s
preemption bids.218 In both cases, the courts noted the lack of any express
statutory authorization in the RE Act for REA rate regulation or preemption
of state rate regulation.219 The courts also noted that the REA’s actions
seemed solely focused on its role as a creditor and not on the REA’s broader
goal of providing low-cost electricity or on the traditional rate-making
principles that balance risk of shareholders against customer interests.220 The
Seventh Circuit found the entire rulemaking invalid on its face.221 In July
2019, the RUS rescinded its preemption regulations, citing “federal court
decisions.”222
Although the RUS retreated from its quasi regulatory role in its 1995
amendments, power supply cooperatives remain largely unregulated by FERC
and states.223 This is in part because cooperatives have resisted any additional
regulation, maintaining that non-profits are self-regulating.
Jurisdiction over power supply cooperatives is particularly
underdetermined. At least one power supply cooperative, Tri-State, has until
recently argued in court that it should be further limited from state regulation
under the theory that state oversight of a power supply cooperative with
interstate operations would impermissibly interfere with interstate commerce

217. Rate Making Preemption Rule, supra note 187, at 38,647. Under the twopart test, the RUS will assert preemption and assume exclusive jurisdiction over rate
regulation if the Administrator determines that state-approved rates are “inadequate to
produce revenues sufficient to permit the borrower to make required payments on its
secured loans and the borrower has failed to make required payments on its secured
loans.” Id.
218. Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., 109 F.3d at 255; Wabash Valley Power Ass’n,
988 F.2d at 1491.
219. Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., 109 F.3d at 255; Wabash Valley Power Ass’n,
988 F.2d at 1491.
220. Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., 109 F.3d at 257; Wabash Valley Power Ass’n,
988 F.2d at 1489–90.
221. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 1491 (“The REA has not identified
a source of authority in either the express language or the purpose and operation of
the RE Act to justify its preemption regulations.”).
222. Streamlining Electric Program Procedures, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,607, 32,609 (July
9, 2019).
223. But see discussion infra in section II.B.5.
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under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.224 Historically, many power
supply cooperatives have argued that they should not be subject to FERC’s
authority.225 As discussed below in Section II.B., Tri-State recently became
subject to FERC jurisdiction to avoid state rate regulation in Colorado and
New Mexico.
In sum, electricity regulation is split between state and federal
regulation. This split developed because of monopoly pricing and
discrimination concerns and grew to include oversight over resource planning.
Proponents of cooperatives did not see the need for such regulations
because cooperatives had no profit motive. The REA advocated for
exempting cooperatives from both state and federal regulation, and many
states followed this lead. In early years, the REA saw itself as a quasiregulator of cooperatives, both as a lender and as an agency whose mission
was to provide low-cost electricity to rural America. Over time, however,
courts recognized that the RE Act grants no explicit regulatory authority over
cooperatives to the RUS, and the agency’s own actions have prioritized its
role as a lender, not as a regulator balancing the interests of lenders and
customers. As the RUS’s regulatory role diminished, however, neither FERC
nor states have filled in the gap, and cooperatives have used political power
and legal challenges to avoid further regulation. As a result, cooperatives are
subject to a weak regulatory scheme and the limits of state and federal
jurisdictions are at least somewhat uncertain.

C. Coop Successes and Challenges
Before directly addressing how cooperatives are responding to the
challenge of climate change and the need to transition to a low-carbon
electricity system, it is helpful to consider the successes and struggles of
cooperatives.
By 1953, 90% of farms in the United States were receiving central
station electricity service.226 The REA had loaned $2.73 billion to 1079
electricity borrowers, of which 983 were cooperatives.227 These borrowers

224. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 1, Tri-State Generation and Transmission
Ass’n v. N. M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, No. 13-CV-00085-KG-LAM (D.N.M. filed
2013). Tri-State relies on a 1969 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case, TriState Gen.
& Trans. Ass’n, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm. of Wyo., 412 F.2d 115. Id. at 2. In that
case, the court found that Wyoming’s Public Service Commission had unlawfully
interfered with interstate commerce when “it entered directives that resulted in TriState’s Wyoming Member Systems not paying an increased
wholesale rate to Tri-State.” Id.
225. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 391
F.2d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
226. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE RURAL
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION 12 (1953).
227. Id. at 7.; BROWN, supra note 2, at 113.
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were serving almost 4 million rural customers – 67% of which were farmers
– and operating 1.27 million miles of distribution lines.228
Moreover, the combination of federal hydropower and REA-financed
generation and transmission kept electricity prices reasonable. By 1953, rural
electricity rates were on the decline and were comparable to or below forprofit utility rates, despite the fact that service territories of cooperatives were
more dispersed.229
The REA managed all of this while maintaining a less than 1% default
rate for much of its history and while insisting on a policy of area coverage
that ensured that all rural residents were receiving electricity, not just richer
farmers or those located close to profitable electricity distribution corridors.230
The federal REA program provided advantages to cooperatives that forprofit utilities did not have. After the passage of the Pace Act in 1944, rural
cooperatives received a below-market interest rate of 2% until 1973.231 Forprofit utilities accessing private-sector lenders paid at least a 1% higher
interest rate to borrow funds.232 Cooperatives were and continue to be
generally exempt from federal income tax obligations,233 and they were also
often subject to a less burdensome state property tax regime.234
Cooperatives accomplished this feat of electrification despite substantial
challenges and interference. For the first decade of the existence of the REA,
for-profit utilities aggressively challenged cooperatives by seeking to serve
the “cream” of rural areas, by building “spite lines” that interfered with
cooperative service territories, by aggressively litigating against cooperatives,
and by failing to offer reasonable wholesale electricity or transmission
prices.235

228. REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE RURAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 226, at 1; BROWN, supra note 2, at 113 (67% of
subscribers were farmers).
229. BROWN, supra note 2, at 114.
230. Id. at 115.
231. Id. at 114.
232. Id.
233. Beecher, supra note 33, at 228. “Rural electric cooperatives have been
exempt from federal taxation since the Revenue Act of 1916.” Id. A 1980 amendment
to federal tax law maintains this exception as long as rural electricity cooperatives “(1)
[are] organized and operated under cooperative principles; (2) adhere to the activities
for which it was created; and (3) derive no less than eighty five percent of its income
from members.” Id. at 228–29.
234. BROWN, supra note 2, at 115. “States frequently assessed only the earning
power of the cooperatives and not the property, agreeing that since they had a lower
earning power than electric companies operating in the urban market, they must not
be taxed beyond their ability to pay.” Id.
235. Id. at 113.
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That the cooperatives succeeded despite this is a testament to the value
that electrification brought to rural America, both in terms of improvements
in quality of life and economic productivity of rural farms and other
businesses.
The model was deemed successful enough that the federal government
turned to cooperatives to bring telephone service to rural America – which
succeeded – and cooperatives are now playing a role in bringing broadband
internet service to rural communities.236 U.S. rural electric cooperatives have
also served as a model for rural electrification in other countries.237
In the words of one historian, “The R.E.A. is considered one of the most
immediate and profound successes in the history of federal policy-making for
the national economy.”238
For all the early success that cooperatives had electrifying rural America,
a significant number of cooperatives struggled to maintain efficient and
competent administration of their affairs once electrification was
completed.239 The democratic ownership model of cooperatives has often
failed to provide sufficient oversight over the management of these
organizations.240 In a 2018 article, Debra C. Jeter, Randall S. Thomas, &
Harwell Wells described this system as resulting in an “organizational sector
mired in governance dysfunctions stemming from the separation of ownership
and control.”241 Similarly, federal Representative Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.),
whose father helped start a rural electricity cooperative, detailed many ways
in which “coops have failed to serve their members interests.”242
Participation in distribution cooperative elections is generally very low.
According to a 2016 report by the Institute for Local Self Reliance (“ILSR”)
based on data submitted by cooperatives to the RUS, 70% of cooperatives had

236. History of Rural Telecommunications, NTCA – THE RURAL BROADBAND
ASS’N, https://www.ntca.org/ruraliscool/history-rural-telecommunications [perma.cc/
6YDL-J38D] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
237. See, e.g., Pellegrini L. & Tasciotti L., Rural Electrification Now and Then:
Comparing Contemporary Challenges in Developing Countries to the USA’s
Experience in Retrospect, 40 FORUM FOR DEV. STUDIES 153 (2013); Annabel Yadoo
& Heather Cruickshank, The Value of Cooperatives in Rural Electrification, 38
ENERGY POL’Y 2941–47 (2010).
238. Malone, supra note 5.
239. Jeter et al., supra note 3, at 366.
240. Id. at 365.
241. Id. at 363.
242. Cooper, supra note 33, at 339.

446

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

election turnout below 10% during years 2006–2011.243 Out of 583
distribution cooperatives, only 57 had voter participation above 20%.244
Low participation in elections translates into weak accountability for
cooperative boards of directors. Jeter, Thomas, and Wells noted that low voter
participation, and the resulting self-perpetuation of board members, has been
a perennial problem.245 As far back as 1937, REA staff reportedly stated that
no cooperative in “Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio . . . had called an annual meeting
to elect a board of directors.”246 Cooper highlighted that “an Alabama co-op
failed to hold elections for board members for 38 years.”247 ILSR profiled a
member of the Jackson Energy Cooperative in Kentucky who was the first
person to contest a board seat in the cooperative’s 71-year history.248
In at least some cooperatives, proxy voting has been used to give insiders
control over elections, despite the REA’s initial goals of limiting proxy voting
to promote active participation by members.249 In one example highlighted
by ISLR, members of Missouri’s Citizen’s Electric Corporation can sign a
proxy card, and then if they do not vote in a future year, the proxy committee
will vote on the member’s behalf.250
Several advocacy organizations have also pointed out problems with
gender and race representation in the distribution cooperative boards elected
from among the member-owners. In the 1980s, the Southern Regional
Council created the Co-op Democracy and Development Project to challenge
white control of cooperatives serving areas with substantial black populations
in the Southeast.251 An article in the Council’s journal recounted that “in areas
like the Black Belt, self-selected boards of economically powerful whites . . .
dominated management of the co-ops through intimidation, misinformation,
243. John Farrell et al., Report: Re-Member-ing the Electric Cooperative, INST.
LOCAL SELF RELIANCE (Mar. 29, 2016), https://ilsr.org/report-remembering-theelectric-cooperative/ [perma.cc/4BPD-CRAM]. The report was based on data
obtained through a Freedom of Information Act Request to the RUS. Author
correspondence with John Farrell; Matt Grimley, Just How Democratic Are Rural
Electric Cooperatives?, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://ilsr.org/just-how-democratic-are-rural-electric-cooperatives/ [perma.cc/4S79GFXR].
244. Farrell et al., supra note 243.
245. Jeter et al., supra note 3, at 431–32.
246. Id. at 390.
247. Cooper, supra note 33, at 341.
248. Grimley, supra note 243.
249. Id.
250. Id.; Board of Directors, CITIZENS ELECTRIC CORP., https://www.cecmo.com/c
ontent/board-directors#Proxy [perma.cc/7G26-MTJ4] (last visited Jul 5, 2019)
(describing proxy vote policy).
251. Henry Leifermann & Pat Wehner, A Question of Power: Race and
Democracy in Rural Electric Co-ops, 18 J. S. REGIONAL COUNCIL 3, 4 (2003).
FOR
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and blatant manipulation of electoral procedures.”252 More recently, in 2016
a joint project of Labor Neighbor Research and Training Center and Acorn
International found that board members in the 313 Southern rural cooperatives
continued to be overwhelmingly white (95%) and male (90%).253
Self-dealing has also been a longstanding problem with cooperatives,
“with board members being employed by the cooperative, employing
relatives, owning businesses that would benefit from the cooperative (notably
appliance stores), or stealing from the cooperative.”254
In 2007, scandal engulfed the Pedernales Electric Cooperative, the
largest distribution cooperative in the country.255 In a deposition, board
President W.W. “Bud” Burnett, who had served on the board for 40 years,
“had difficulty remembering whether he has ever seen any of the electric
utility’s budgets, whether the board has any standing committees and who, if
anyone, approves top executive and director expenses, including his own.”
Burnett also drew a $190,000 annual salary as employee of the cooperative
with the title of “coordinator.”256 The cooperative’s general manager, Bennie
Fuelberg, was awarded a $2 million deferred compensation package and a
$375,000 signing bonus without the cooperative’s members’ knowledge.257
When the House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform held a hearing on the self-dealing, Committee Chair Rep.
Henry Waxman stated that over the past five years “Mr. Fuelberg and the
board spent $700,000 to stay in five-star hotels like the Ritz Carlton and Four
Seasons, dine at expensive restaurants, and buy themselves fancy chocolates
and Celine Dion concert tickets. They also spent millions of dollars in an
unsuccessful legal battle against their own customers.”258
The Pedernales situation was not unique. In the past two years the TriCounty Electric Cooperative came under scrutiny for having board members
pay themselves an average of $52,000, accrued from “calling short meetings
– as brief as 15 minutes long – and then collecting a $450-a-day” per diem.259
252. Id. at 3.
253. LABOR NEIGHBOR RES. & TRAINING CTR. & ACORN INT’L, THE CRISIS IN
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES IN THE SOUTH 2 (2016), http://ruralpowerproject.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Rural-Power___Final.pdf [perma.cc/3P3M-896W].
254. Jeter et al., supra note 3, at 391 (citing RONALD R. KLINE, CONSUMERS IN
THE COUNTRY: TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN RURAL AMERICA 170–71
(2000)).
255. Claudia Grisales, Testimony Shows How Co-op Operates at Top, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 2007, at A.1.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Governance and Financial Accountability of Rural Electric Cooperatives:
The Pedernales Experience, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (opening statement of Chair Rep. Henry
Waxman).
259. Avery G. Wilks, SC Utility’s Part-Time Board Enriched Itself While
Customers Paid High Power Bill, THE STATE (May 21, 2018),
https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article211575649.html.
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The board members also awarded themselves lifetime health insurance
through the cooperative’s employee-benefit plan.260 In 2010, an audit found
that another South Carolina cooperative, Santee Electric Cooperative,
similarly doubled their per diem to $450, awarded themselves cash bonuses
at the end of the year, and “spent nearly $342,000 in one year – far above the
national average – to send its full nine-member board to out-of-town events
and conferences.”261
Cooperatives have also sought expansion into various other businesses.
“A suburban Atlanta co-op turned over its entire operation to a for-profit
subsidiary that diversified into ‘pest control, mortgages, consulting, a
customer call center, staffing, security systems, natural gas and another co-op
in South Carolina.’”262 The Denton County Electric Cooperative, which
served a district around Fort Worth, Texas, borrowed more than $1 billion to
branch “out into telecommunications and real estate. It bought a golf course,
a luxury Westin hotel in Fort Worth and part of a shopping mall.”263 In 2001
it went bankrupt.264
This type of mismanagement and self-dealing should sting all the more
because it is done with the equity of the member-owners. Cooperative
members own the assets of the cooperative in proportion to the amount of
electricity they have purchased from the cooperative.265 To the extent that
cooperative funds are mismanaged, wasted, or stolen, member owners bear
the costs.
In addition, while cooperatives need to keep a portion of member equity
as working capital, distribution cooperatives have struggled to return excess
member equity in a principled way.266 Early in their history, cooperatives did
not refund member equity because they needed to build financial strength and
to use the equity to expand member services.267 Yet as cooperatives became
more established, many “continued to accumulate capital credits without

260. Id.
261. Avery G. Wilks, High Pay and Expensive Perks: Has ‘Absolute Power’
Corrupted SC Electric Co-ops?, THE STATE (August 9, 2018), https://www.thestate.c
om/news/politics-government/article216222990.html.
262. Cooper, supra note 33, at 341 (citing Margaret Newkirk, From Co-op to
Conglomerate, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 19, 2007, at IA).
263. Seven Mufson, Defaults Plague Little-Known Big Lender, WASH. POST, Apr.
30, 2007, at D1.
264. Id.
265. Emmanuel S. Tipon, Annotation, Co-operative Associations: Rights in
Equity Credits or Patronage Dividends, 50 A.L.R.3d 434 (originally published in
1973).
266. Jeffrey S. Royer, Assessing the Ability of Rural Electric Cooperatives to
Retire Capital Credits, 31 J. COOPERATIVES 32, 33 (2016).
267. Id.

2020]

GREENING THE OLD NEW DEAL

449

establishing plans for retiring them.”268 Since the issue was first addressed in
the 1970s, most cooperatives have implemented policies that result in the
refund of member equity; a 2003 report found that 84% of cooperatives with
adequate levels of equity were refunding “capital credits” to member
owners.269 However, there are still reports of cooperatives hoarding equity.270
For example, Cooper highlighted that cooperatives that purchase electricity
from the Tennessee Valley Authority maintained excess reserves and “refused
to refund any member equity.”271
Finally, according to some sources, cooperatives have not always
succeeded in their principle mission – providing low cost electricity service
to their member-owners.272 Cooper points to a 1996 National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association (“NRECA”) report acknowledging that average
cooperative electricity rates were 9% higher than neighboring IOUs.273
Cooperatives achieved an unprecedented triumph by electrifying rural
America cost-effectively, but many have also struggled with competent
management. Both sides of the story are important when considering how
cooperatives are responding to the challenge of climate change.

III. COOPS AND THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Preventing the worst harms of climate change will require a “nearcomplete decarbonization” of the U.S. electricity industry by 2050.274
Although there are multiple pathways to this end, they all require development
of massive amounts of new renewable resources and the retirement of most
fossil-fuel generation that does not capture and store emitted GHGs. Such a
transition will pose numerous technical and operational challenges, including
the need to adapt to the variable nature of wind and solar resources, to
incorporate increasingly prolific customer-sited energy resources such as
rooftop solar, and to integrate energy storage that is now economically viable
at scale for the first time. In addition, the electricity sector will need to
accommodate new uses of electricity, including electric vehicles.
These new technologies are already decarbonizing the grid, and at the
same time they are also changing the business model of electricity. In the old
model, a vertically integrated utility produced power at large, centralized
power plants and distributed it to its captive customers. Now, all kinds of
entities can be players in the electricity market, from residents with rooftop
268. Id.
269. Id. at 34.
270. Id.
271. Cooper, supra note 33, at 340.
272. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 154, 161 (1997). “The
concept of operation at cost simply means that a cooperative was organized for the
purpose of rendering economic services, without gain to itself, to shareholders or to
members who own and control it.” Id.
273. Cooper, supra note 33, at 339.
274. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 13, at 48.
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solar and electric cars to companies that can participate in demand side
management and have their own backup power.
As a result, there is tremendous dynamism and uncertainty in what the
utility business model of the future will look like and how it will be regulated.
One certainty, however, is that utilities will need to transition from
fossil-fuel resources to zero-carbon energy resources. This shift is already
happening. Thanks in large part to economic factors, federal tax credits, and
state mandates, the United States has witnessed a substantial shift away from
coal and towards renewables, along with significant increases in conservation
from efficiency measures.
For the most part, however, cooperatives have lagged behind in this
transition to cleaner energy. Part A of this section first summarizes available
evidence demonstrating that cooperatives have moved slower than their forprofit counterparts to reduce reliance on coal and ramp up renewable energy.
It also identifies several structural factors that have inhibited this transition,
including a federal law that promoted coal-fired generation at a time when
cooperatives were adding generation resources and the inability of non-profit
cooperatives to directly take advantage of federal renewable energy tax
credits. Part B then provides a case study of Tri-State and its member
distribution cooperatives to highlight some of the ways that the power supplydistribution cooperative structure has stymied efforts by distribution
cooperatives to accelerate the shift to clean energy in Colorado and New
Mexico.

A. Coops Have Lagged Behind in the Transition to Clean Energy
Existing data makes it difficult to comprehensively understand the GHG
emission and generation picture of electric cooperatives. The leading
government data sources do not code generation resource ownership based on
utility type. Utilities also often share ownership of generation resources and
contract for electricity. This Part presents an overview of the best data
available within those limitations.
According to NRECA, cooperatives have reduced carbon emissions 9%
between 2009 and 2017. In comparison, the electric power sector as a whole
has reduced carbon emissions 23% in the same time period.275
Moreover, in a 2019 edition of an annual report that benchmarks air
emissions of the 100 largest electricity producers (“Benchmarking Report”),

275. Compare Nat’l Rural Electric Cooperative Ass’n, supra note 10 (citing to
EPA and EIA data), with Energy Information Administration, U.S. Electric Power
Industry Estimated Emissions by State (EIA-767, EIA-906, EIA-920, and EIA-923,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ [perma.cc/3KN7-X5YW] (carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions for total electric power industry, 2009-2017).
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M.J. Bradley and Associates found that six out of the top ten most carbonintensive emitters were cooperatives.276
Ten cooperatives make the overall list of 100 largest emitters.277 In
2017, those 10 cooperatives accounted for 4% of the total electricity
generation of the group, but because of their carbon-intensity, accounted for
6% of total carbon dioxide emissions.278 The 10 cooperatives together have a
much higher carbon-intensity than for-profit or municipal utilities in the
report: 1701 pounds per megawatt hour (lbs/Mwh) compared to 979 and 781,

276. VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 17; see also Moody’s Investor Service,
Press Release: US Public Power and Electric Generation and Transmission
Cooperative Utilities Face Risking Risks from Carbon Transition, MOODYS.COM
(2018), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-US-public-power-and-electricgeneration-and-transmission-cooperative—PR_383734 [perma.cc/N8CYS9GJ] (last
visited Feb 19, 2020) (“public power and G&T coops have higher carbon intensities
in their generation fleets than their IOU peers”).
277. VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 7. The ten are: Basin Electric Power
Cooperative, Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc., Oglethorpe Power Corp., TriState Generation and Transmission, Inc., Buckeye Power, Inc., Seminole Electric
Cooperative, Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp., Great River Energy, East
Kentucky Power Cooperative, and Power South Energy Cooperative. Id.
278. Calculations of the author based on 2017 data set provided by M.J. Bradley
& Associates. See M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCIATES, BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS OF
THE 100 LARGEST ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2019). Data
available at: M.J. Bradley & Associates, Benchmarking Air Emissions - Past Reports,
https://mjbradley.com/content/benchmarking-air-emissions-past-reports
[perma.cc/B8RV-D26X].
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respectively.279 Moreover, the 9 cooperatives that have made the top 100
report every year since 2008 have been slower to reduce their carbon intensity
when compared with the electric power sector as a whole.280
The chief reason for this high carbon intensity is that coal-fired power
plants account for a disproportionate share of the generation capacity owned
by cooperatives. In 2014, NRECA reported that 65 power supply
cooperatives provided power to 668 of the 838 distribution cooperatives.281
The power supply cooperatives produced half of the generation required by
these 668 distribution cooperatives, and at least 75% of the generation
supplied by the power supply cooperatives was from coal-fired power
plants.282
A key factor for this large reliance on coal is that many of these power
plants were built between 1979 and 1987, when the federal Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act (“FUA”) prohibited the use of natural gas or
petroleum as “a primary energy source in new electric power plants.”283 The
Act also mandated that any new power plant be “coal capable.”284 The FUA
was enacted during the energy crisis of the Carter Administration when “oil
and gas resources were expected to become scarce” and aimed to speed a shift
to the use of coal for electricity generation.285 According to NRECA, “about
two-thirds of today’s cooperative coal-fired generation was built under the
279. Id.
280. The 9 cooperatives are the same as listed in note 277 with the omission of
Power South Energy Cooperative. Computations by the author based on 2008–2017
cooperative carbon dioxide emissions and electricity generation data provided by M.J.
Bradley & Associates from their 2010 through 2019 BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS
OF THE 100 LARGEST ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCERS IN THE UNITED STATES REPORTS,
Id., as compared with total electric power sector emissions and generation data from
the Energy Information Administration (“EIA”). EIA datasets used were: U.S.
Electric Power Industry Estimated Emissions by State (EIA-767, EIA-906, EIA-920,
and EIA-923) and Net Generation by State by Type of Producer by Energy Source
(EIA-906,
EIA-920,
and
EIA-923),
both
available
at
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ [perma.cc/8QSS-LXCH].
281. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CARBON
POLLUTION EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC
UTILITY GENERATING UNITS AND NOTICE OF DATA AVAILABILITY 1 (2014).
282. Id.
283. Pub. L. No. 95-620 § 201, 92 Stat. 3289, 3298 (1978), repealed by Pub. L.
No. 100-42, 100 Stat. 310 (1987).
284. Id.
285. Fuel Use Act Repealed, CQ ALMANAC 1987, at 323 (1988),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal87-1145085
[perma.cc/7WSK-JBKZ].
Among the purposes enumerated in the act are to “conserve natural gas and petroleum
for uses, . . . other than . . . generation of . . . electricity, for which there are no feasible
alternative fuels” and to “foster the greater use of coal and other alternate fuels . . . as
a primary energy source.” § 102(b), 92 Stat. at 3291.
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Act’s ‘coal capable’ mandate” before those provisions were repealed in
1987.286
Even after the FUA mandate ended in 1987, however, cooperatives
continued to initiate build outs of coal-fired power plants at a higher rate than
for-profit utilities.287
Cooperatives also have less renewable capacity within their ownedgeneration portfolios. An analysis of the M.J. Bradley & Associates data for
the largest 100 power producers shows that the 10 cooperatives that are part
of that group have very limited renewable capacity within their ownedgeneration mix, particularly when compared to for-profit utilities.288 Among
this group, for-profit utilities grew their renewable generation resources from
4% to nearly 8% between 2012 and 2017.289 The largest 9 cooperative utilities
barely grew self-owned renewable generation, going from 0.9% to 1%.290
An important caveat is that this data represents renewable generation
owned by power producers, and there is an important structural reason why
power supply cooperatives may choose not to build self-owned renewable
generation. Federal tax credits have been the primary driver of increased
renewable energy deployment over the past two decades.291 The Production
Tax Credit (“PTC”) provides a 2.3 cents per kilowatt hour credit for wind
electricity produced in a project, and the solar Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”)
provides a credit for up to 30% of capital costs in solar projects.292 Because
most cooperatives are non-profit entities exempted from federal income tax,
however, tax-exempt cooperatives cannot access these benefits as owners of
qualifying projects.293 In contrast, through long-term power purchase

286. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, supra note 281, at 11.
287. Fischlein et al., supra note 23, at 780. “Despite a recent bout of project
cancellations, [cooperatives and municipal utilities] still propose 20% capacity growth
from coal, compared to 4.9% for investor-owned utilities.” Id.
288. See supra note 275.
289. Compare M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCIATES, BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS OF
THE 100 LARGEST ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), with
M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCIATES, BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS OF THE 100 LARGEST
ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2014) (using 2017 and 2012
data, respectively).
290. Calculations of the author based on 2012 through 2017 data sets provided by
M.J. Bradley and Associates and EIA data for Renewable Energy Generation. See data
information supra at note 289.
291. TRIEU MAI ET AL., IMPACTS OF FEDERAL TAX CREDIT EXTENSIONS ON
RENEWABLE DEPLOYMENT AND POWER SECTOR EMISSIONS iv (2016).
292. Id. at 1–2. Both tax credits are in the process of phasing down. Emma
Foehringer Merchant, US Lawmakers Stiff Solar, Wind Gets Modest Victory in Tax
Deal, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/u-s-lawmakers-hand-clean-energy-tax-credits-a-loss-though-wind-gets-a-win
[perma.cc/XYX8-K7C4].
293. VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 19 (“ Rural cooperatives are non-profit
entities that are generally unable to take advantage of renewable tax credits, so they
will tend to purchase renewable energy under long-term contracts rather than owning
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agreements (“PPAs”), a cooperative can contract with a for-profit developer
that can then pass along some of the benefits of these important federal
subsidies to the cooperative.294 For this reason, cooperatives likely find it
advantageous to contract, instead of self-own, renewable electricity. For
example, in 2017 Basin Electric Power Cooperative, the nation’s largest
power supply cooperative that serves 2.8 million customers in 11 states,
owned 285.7 MW of wind capacity but held PPAs for 1,274.9 MW of wind
generation capacity.295 Golden Spread Electric Cooperative in Texas owned
78.2 MW of wind capacity but held PPAs for 200 MW of wind.296 Some
power supply cooperatives like Tri-State, however, are not tax-exempt and
therefore are not subject to this barrier.
Another likely reason that cooperatives have been slower to shift to zerocarbon resources or to implement energy efficiency is that cooperatives are
frequently exempted from state renewable electricity mandates or given
weaker targets. Fischlein, Smith, and Wilson stated in a 2009 article that only
7 state renewable electricity mandates fully applied to consumer-owned
utilities, and another 9 included them with exceptions or special provisions.297
Similarly, of the 27 state programs that set binding energy efficiency
mandates on utilities, 16 completely excluded consumer-owned utilities.298
As described in more detail in the case study below, there has also been
tension between distribution cooperatives that are seeking to increase local
renewable energy and power supply cooperatives that would prefer to avoid
load defection to local renewable energy generation.299
Cooperatives have taken some steps to implement energy efficiency and
shift to renewable energy. Starting in 1980, the REA created the Energy
Resources Conservation Program.300 In 2013, the Obama Administration
expanded scope and breadth of the program and made available $250 million
in funding to support energy efficiency and small scale renewable energy
projects.301
the facilities.”); Herman K. Trabish, How Rural Co-Ops Are Shifting to a Cleaner
Power Mix, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/howrural-co-ops-are-shifting-to-a-cleaner-power-mix/503024/ [perma.cc/Z4JA-8JNT].
294. VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 19
295. Trabish, supra note 293.
296. Id.
297. Fischlein et al., supra note 23, at 782.
298. Id.
299. See infra Part II.B.
300. See Extension of Principal Repayments to Achieve Conservation Objectives,
45 Fed. Reg. 82,623 (1980).
301. Energy Efficiency and Conservation Loan Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,356,
73,356–58 (2013). Congress amended the RE Act in 1993 to expressly authorize REA
loans for “demand side management, energy conservation programs, and on-grid and
off-grid renewable energy systems,” Rural Electrification Loan Restructuring Act of
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The NRECA has also launched the Solar Utility Network Deployment
Acceleration project, which uses funding from DOE to “develop models and
resources for electric cooperatives interested in developing solar energy.”302
A 2018 report issued by the NRECA stated that in the four years after the
project started in 2014, cooperatives owned or purchased 9 times as much
solar photovoltaic (“PV”) power as they did in 2013.303
Despite these clean energy initiatives, cooperatives have until this point
generally opposed ambitious state and federal clean energy and climate
change policies. Many cooperatives have demanded to be exempted from the
state renewable electricity mandates – referred to as renewable portfolio
standards (“RPS”) – that have been a primary driver of renewable energy
development.304 Similarly, the NRECA opposed the Obama Administration’s
federal GHG regulations for existing power plants in exceptionally strong
terms – calling the proposed regulation full of “misinformed statements and
Pollyannaish judgments.”305

B. Case Study: Tri-State Coops in CO and NM
The tension between power supply and distribution cooperatives when it
comes to shifting to a low-carbon electricity system has played out
dramatically in Colorado and New Mexico.306 This Section provides a case
study of how some distribution cooperatives in these states have challenged
their power supply cooperative, Tri-State, in an effort to allow them to develop
more locally-sited renewable energy. These efforts included seeking
clarification from FERC that would allow cooperatives to use PURPA to
supersede self-generation limits in their wholesale power supply contract with
Tri-State and ultimately seeking to buy-out their contract with Tri-State and

1993, Pub. L. No. 103-129 § 2(c)(1)(B), 107 Stat. 1363, and then again in 2008 to
revise the language to list “energy efficiency and conservation programs” as one of
the approved uses, 2008 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 4(a), § 6101, 122 Stat.
1664, 1956 (2008).
302. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, A SOLAR REVOLUTION IN RURAL
AMERICA 1 (2018).
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Marianne Goodland, Rural Co-ops Reject Proposed Renewable
Standards, J.-ADVOCATE (May 8, 2019), https://search.proquest.com/docview/132655
9641/abstract/AC5B1E07C1B241EBPQ/3 [perma.cc/5QYS-EP7Q]; Gene Zaleski,
Co-ops: Renewable Energy Standard Has Costs, MCCLATCHY - TRIBUNE BUS. NEWS
(Mar. 31, 2011), https://search.proquest.com/docview/859429781/abstract/AC5B1E0
7C1B241EBPQ/34 [perma.cc/AFU8-MSH4].
305. See e.g., Rod Kuckro, Coal-Heavy Electric Cooperatives Take Hard Line on
EPA
Clean
Power
Plan,
ENERGYWIRE,
December
15,
2014,
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060010539 [perma.cc/Q5T5-2QER].
306. See Kevin Robinson-Avila, Changing Energy Landscape Shakes Up Rural
Co-ops, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.abqjournal.com/1389706/cha
nging-energy-landscape-shakes-up-rural-coops.html [perma.cc/M6KT-US5W].
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exit the power supply cooperative.307 In 2019, legislatures in both states
passed ambitious laws that would drive a cleaner energy mix and that
explicitly applied to cooperatives.308 Following all of these developments,
Tri-State announced that it would be closing its remaining coal-fired power
plants in Colorado and New Mexico.309

1. Tri-State’s Organization and Generation Mix
Originally formed in 1952, Tri-State is one of the largest power supply
cooperatives.310 It has 43 member distribution cooperatives in 4 states:
Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Nebraska.311 In 2017, Tri-State sold
18 million MWh of electricity for $1.3 billion in revenue.312 The majority of
that electricity – 88.3% – was sold to its members, and the rest was sold to
other market participants.313
Each Tri-State member distributive cooperative selects one director,
trustee, or general manager to sit on Tri-State’s Board of Directors, and each
member receives one vote.314 Each member cooperative has signed a longterm requirements contract with Tri-State, promising to purchase at least 95%
of their power from Tri-State at rates set by the Tri-State Board of Directors.315
These contracts extend through 2050 for all but one member cooperative,
whose contract extends through 2040.316
Tri-State charges the same wholesale electricity rate to all of its member
cooperatives, sometimes called a “postage stamp” rate.317 In 2018, the
average wholesale rate for members was 7.5 cents per kWh.318

307.
308.
309.
310.

See infra Part B.II.4.
See infra Part B.II.6.
See infra Part B.II.7.
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, NM RURAL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES, http://www.nmelectric.coop/tristate [perma.cc/Z3EZ-K8VD] (last
visited Feb. 25, 2020).
311. TRI-STATE GENERATION & TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATION, INC., BETTER
TOGETHER: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 18–19 (2019) [hereinafter TRI-STATE 2018
ANNUAL REPORT].
312. Id. at 39.
313. Id.
314. TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATION INC., BYLAWS
Art. I, IV (amended and restated Apr. 3, 2016).
315. TRI-STATE 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 311, at 39.
316. Id. at 39.
317. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. N.M. Pub. Regulation
Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1068, 1069 (10th Cir. 2015). The rate is a combination of an
energy charge and a demand charge. Id.
318. TRI-STATE 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 311, at 5.
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Although Tri-State relied on federal RUS loans to finance most of its
power plants and transmission wires, Tri-State paid off its RUS debt in
2014.319 It is therefore no longer subject to oversight as an RUS borrower.
Of the 18 million MWh of electricity sold by Tri-State, more than half
came from coal-fired power plants.320 Tri-State owns five coal-fired power
plants built between 1959 and 2006. Approximately 30% of the rest of the
power it sold in 2017 came from hydroelectric power supplied by the Western
Area Power Administration (“WAPA”) and from renewable energy PPAs.
Tri-State’s contracted-for-power capacity is about evenly split between
WAPA hydropower contracts and PPAs for wind and solar.321

2. Reasons for Member Coop Dissatisfaction
Tri-State member distribution cooperatives have identified a number of
reasons for seeking to increase renewable energy, including lower energy
costs, local economic development, and resiliency benefits. Distribution
cooperatives seeking to develop such resources, however, are constrained by
the terms of their power supply contracts with Tri-State, which until recently
limited distribution coops to owning no more than 5% of their supply.
i. High Wholesale Rates
One of the chief reasons for member cooperative dissatisfaction with
Tri-State is the cost of wholesale electricity and the number of rate increases
over the past decade and a half.322 Between 2000 and 2016 Tri-State’s rates
more than doubled over the course of 12 rate increases.323 As an example,
wholesale rates charged to Kit Carson Electric Cooperative (“Kit Carson”)
increased from 3.9 to 7.9 cents per kWh.324 In contrast to Tri-State’s 7.5 cent
average wholesale retail electricity rate, current regional wholesale electricity
prices are just over 3 cents.325
319. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., Initial Rate Filing
of FERC Electric Tariff Volume No. 1 at 8 (Dec. 23, 2019) (No. ER19-2442-000)
[hereinafter Tri-State Initial Rate Filing].
320. Of the 9.6 million total MWh of electricity produced by Tri-State-owned
power plants, 93% came from coal. VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 35.
321. Computed by subtracting 579 MW aggregate generation capacity specified
for wind and solar PPAs from 1170 MW total “renewable” generation capacity. TRISTATE 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 311, at 5, 63.
322. Mark Jaffe, Rural Electric Cooperatives Look at Cutting the Cord, COL. POL.
(Aug. 7, 2018), https://coloradopolitics.com/colorado-rural-electric-cooperatives/
[perma.cc/E3UA-3NU5].
323. KARLE CATES & SETH FEASTER, CASE STUDY: HOW KIT CARSON
ENGINEERED A COST-EFFECTIVE COAL EXIT 3–4 (2019), http://ieefa.org/ieefa-reportnew-mexico-electric-co-op-gains-from-breakup-with-coal-centric-tri-state-group/
[perma.cc/J53W-DZ48].
324. Id. at 4.
325. Jaffe, supra note 322.
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Tri-State’s relatively high rate reflects its investment choices and heavy
capital spending.326 Tri-State has developed 5562 miles of high voltage
transmission lines and has interests in five coal-fired and six natural gas-fired
power plants.327 In 2006, it sought to build 895 MW of coal generation
capacity in Holcomb, Kansas.328 This was the wrong bet at a time when the
electricity sector was changing rapidly; energy demand was flattening and
prices for competing generation resources – natural gas and renewables – were
dropping significantly.329 Ultimately, Tri-State abandoned the proposal in
2017 due in part to environmental challenges, at a loss of $93 million that will
be borne by its member distribution cooperatives.330
In addition to the rate increases, cooperatives have complained about the
lack of certainty about when such increases would happen. The Tri-State
board has unilateral authority to increase rates, and member cooperatives
complained that although they knew rates would go up, they never knew how
much.331
ii. Desire for Increased, Locally-Sited, Renewable Energy
Many of the disgruntled cooperatives are interested in increasing
renewable electricity generation, and particularly locally-sited renewable
electricity.
Renewable energy is attractive because of rapidly dropping costs in the
region. For example, in northern Colorado, Mountain Parks Electric recently
negotiated a power purchase agreement from a solar facility for 4.5 cents per
kWh.332

326. See id.; Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 33 (Dec. 31, 2018) (listing ownership interests).
327. Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 326.
328. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., Annual Report at
13 (Form 10-K) (Mar. 8, 2018).
329. See Allen Best, A Time of Inflection for Rural America’s Energy Paradigms,
MOUNTAIN TOWN NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://mountaintownnews.net/2018/01/31/a
-time-for-inflection-for-rural-americas-energy/ [perma.cc/R69M-JMET].
330. Joe Smyth, Economic Reality Sets in for Tri-State Efforts to Expand the
Holcomb Coal Plant, CLEAN COOPERATIVE BLOG (Sep. 14, 2017),
https://www.cleancooperative.com/news/colorado-utility-says-odds-it-will-build-amajor-new-coal-plant-are-now-remote [perma.cc/Q4YM-B5K2]; Kansas: Utility
Abandons Proposed Coal Power Plant, ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1062091229/search?keyword=holcomb
[perma.cc/H3D8-RFEH] (noting announcement by Tri-State project partner to
abandon effort to build plant on January 15, 2020).
331. CATES & FEASTER, supra note 323, at 4.
332. Jaffe, supra note 322.
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Local renewable energy can also provide other benefits. By being closer
to electricity users, it can reduce transmission line losses.333 When the
generation can be directly interconnected with the distribution grid, it avoids
transmission service charges and potentially avoids the need to build
additional transmission capacity. Depending on how the renewable resource
matches with electricity load, local renewables can also help reduce electricity
demand at peak usage times, reducing the amount of generation capacity
otherwise required.334
Another major rationale offered by communities seeking to promote
renewable development is the desire for local economic benefits. Coalfield
communities have also looked at alternate sources of local power to replace
some of the lost economic activity related to coal mining and the retirement
of coal-fired power plants.335
Finally, several cooperatives have expressed interest in shifting to a lowcarbon electricity system to address climate change. In 2016, Kit Carson set
a goal of serving its customers with 100% renewable electricity by 2023,336
and in 2019 La Plata Electric Association announced a goal of reducing its
carbon footprint 50% below 2018 levels by 2030.337 Two other cooperatives
in Colorado that are not served by Tri-State – Grand Valley Power and Holy
Cross Energy – also announced GHG or clean energy goals in 2018 or 2019.338
Until very recently, however, Tri-State was not moving quickly to
increase its utility-scale procurement of renewable energy; instead, it was
betting on a large new coal plant in Kansas to meet its projected load.339
Moreover, Tri-State’s power supply contract and its implementing
policies limited distribution cooperatives from developing a significant
portion of their own generation and prevented cooperatives from benefitting
financially from locally-sited generation.
Under the power supply contracts with Tri-State, member distribution
cooperatives agree to receive 95 to 100% of their electricity requirements
from Tri-State.340 Up to 5% of a member’s requirements “can be obtained

333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See, e.g., Order on Petition for Declaratory Order at 1, 15 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,238
(June 18, 2015) (No. EL15-43).
336. Laurie Stone, A Rural Electric Cooperative Sets a 100% Renewables Target,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. (2016), https://rmi.org/rural-electric-cooperative-sets-100renewables-target/ [perma.cc/ZQF2-MA5G].
337. Joe Smyth, More Colorado Co-ops Announce Clean Energy Goals, CLEAN
COOPERATIVE (FEB. 11, 2019), http://www.cleancooperative.com/1/post/2019/02/mor
e-colorado-co-ops-announce-clean-energy-goals.html [perma.cc/ZU39-V4EQ].
338. Id.
339. Best, supra note 329.
340. Power Supply Contract between Delta Montrose Electric Association and
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association at 1, Exhibit B, Petition of Delta
Montrose Electric Assoc., Delta-Montrose Electric Assoc., 151 FERC ¶ 61,238, reh’g
denied, 153 FERC ¶ 61,028 (2015).
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from generation owned or controlled” by the distribution cooperative.341
These provisions were initially required to be included in power supply
contracts by REA/RUS to ensure that power supply cooperatives would have
sufficient revenue to pay back federal loans.342
At least 5 distribution cooperatives that are Tri-State members have
reached the 5% limit on self-owned or controlled generation.343
In addition to the 5% limit, Tri-State Board Policy 115 imposes fees on
the distribution cooperative-owned or -controlled generation within the 5%
cap.344 Under Policy 115, distribution cooperatives are charged for the
electricity generated at their facilities at the normal Tri-State postage stamp
rate and are then credited on their bills at a lower rate for the electricity
produced from their local generation.345 The rationale for this policy is that
cooperatives that choose to exercise the 5% self-generation option decrease
overall revenues to Tri-State, thereby increasing fixed costs among remaining
cooperatives not pursuing self-generation.346 The policy therefore seeks to
have coops that exercise the self-generation option effectively pay Tri-State’s
fixed costs on top of their generation cost to “minimize subsidization between
Member Systems that choose to implement this option and Member Systems
that do not.”347
Tri-State has also applied Policy 115 to electricity supplied from a
cooperative’s battery storage resource.348
A complaint by member
distribution cooperative United Power alleged that Tri-State “effectively
double charges . . . for [electric storage resource capacity]” by imposing

341. Id. at 2.
342. Proposed Rate Making Preemption Rule, supra note 201, at 12,195.
343. They include United Power, the Delta-Montrose Electric Association
(“DMEA”), the La Plata Electric Association (“LPEA”), San Miguel Power, and
Mora-San Miguel Electric. Joe Smyth, Uncooperative: Tri-State Policies are Limiting
Colorado Communities from Developing Local Renewable Energy Projects, CLEAN
COOPERATIVE (Jan. 2018) http://www.cleancooperative.com/uncooperative.html#app
roaching [perma.cc/S8JZ-LEJ5]; Joe Smyth, Uncooperative: Tri-State Policies are
Limiting New Mexico Co-ops’ Access to Cheap Solar Power, CLEAN COOPERATIVE,
(Mar. 2018), http://www.cleancooperative.com/uncooperative-new-mexico.html
[perma.cc/P3MN-96CJ].
344. TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATION, INC., BOARD OF
DIRECTORS POLICY 4 (2017).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss
Formal Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Stay Proceeding at 5, United Power, Inc.
v. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass’n, (Col. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2019) (No.
19F-0691E).
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capacity charges both when the storage resource is charged and then when it
is discharged.349

3. Kit Carson’s Exit from Tri-State and Subsequent Accelerated
Clean Energy Pathway
As a result of these grievances, the Kit Carson distribution cooperative
bought out its power supply contract in 2016 and left Tri-State, creating a
potential model for other cooperatives.350
Kit Carson serves Taos, Rio Arriba, and Colfax counties in norther New
Mexico.351 This covers a diverse service area, including the city of Taos, ski
resorts at Taos Valley and Angel Fire, the Native American Pueblos of Taos
and Picuris, and rural ranching communities.352 Kit Carson serves 29,000
electricity customers, and its revenue in 2017 was $42 million.353
The distribution cooperative’s leadership and members were eager to
achieve lower prices for their members and shift to renewable energy through
the development of local renewable energy. After unsuccessfully seeking
changes to the power supply contract through Tri-State, Kit Carson sought to
exit from their contract.354
Tri-State’s bylaws allow for distribution members to withdraw from the
power supply cooperative “upon compliance with such equitable terms and
conditions as the Board of Directors may prescribe,” but only if the
distribution cooperative “has met all its contractual obligations to this
Corporation.”355 In practice, this means that the cooperative must “buy out”
its contract with Tri-State. In 2015, Kit Carson agreed to a $37 million exit
fee.356
Subsequent to leaving Tri-State, Kit Carson entered into a 10-year, fixed
price, wholesale power supply contract with energy brokerage Guzman
Energy.357 During the first 6 years of the Guzman-Kit Carson contract, KitCarson’s wholesale power rates will incorporate payments to cover a loan for

349. Formal Complaint at 2, United Power, Inc. v. Tri-State Generation and
Transmission Ass’n, (Col. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2019) (No. 19F-0691E).
350. Jaffe, supra note 322.
351. About Us, KIT CARSON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, https://kitcarson.com/aboutus [perma.cc/R2KK-AVU8] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
352. 2019
Media
Kit,
KIT
CARSON
ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE,
https://kitcarson.com/2018-media-kit [perma.cc/A38N-7AVK] (last visited Feb. 26,
2020).
353. See KIT CARSON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT (2017),
available
at
https://kitcarson.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2017-AnnualReport.pdf [perma.cc/R3VN-7BQU]; Jaffe, supra note 322.
354. Jaffe, supra note 322.
355. TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATION INC., BYLAWS,
supra note 311, at Art. I § 4(a).
356. CATES & FEASTER, supra note 323, at 3.
357. Id.
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the $37 million exit-fee Kit Carson paid to Tri-State.358 Even during that
period, however, the wholesale rates will be lower than what Kit Carson paid
during its last contract year with Tri-State, 7.9 cents per kWh.359 Rates are
projected to drop substantially during 2022 to 2025, to an average of 4.7 cents
per kWh.360 Kit Carson leaders estimate the Guzman contract will save $50
to $70 million over the life of the contract.361
In addition, there is no cap on self-generation in the Kit Carson-Guzman
contract.362 After entering into the contract with Guzman, Kit Carson
established its goal of being 100% daytime solar reliant by 2022.363 The
cooperative has partnered with Guzman to add 8.5 MW of solar power to its
grid.364 As of January 2020, it had added 5 solar arrays totaling over 6 MW
of capacity, with another 3 MW array pending completion.365 Kit Carson was
also in negotiations for another 21 MW of solar with battery storage.366 The
cooperative’s leadership estimates that the solar buildout will bring $10
million of direct local economic benefits, including 50 full-time jobs per
year.367

4. Delta-Montrose’s Attempt to Use PURPA to Greenlight
Additional Local Renewables
The Delta-Montrose Electric Association (“Delta-Montrose”) is another
Tri-State distribution cooperative dissatisfied with Tri-State’s rates and with
the restrictions on development of local renewable resources.368
Delta-Montrose first sought to use a provision of PURPA as a way to get
around the self-generation limitation in the Tri-State power supply contract.369
PURPA’s Section 210 – as implemented through FERC regulations – requires

358. Id. at 4.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 5.
361. Id. at 4–5.
362. Id. at 3.
363. Id. at 4.
364. Id. at 5.
365. KCEC’s Solar Production, KIT CARSON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
https://kitcarson.com/kcecs-solar-fleet [perma.cc/7A6N-JMGF] (last visited Feb. 26,
2020).
366. Id.
367. CATES & FEASTER, supra note 323, at 5.
368. Id.
369. See Alison Holm, FERC Ruling Paves Way for Increased Local Renewable
Energy Generation, NREL (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.nrel.gov/state-localtribal/blog/posts/ferc-ruling-paves-way-for-increased-local-renewable-energygeneration.html [perma.cc/24ZV-XQEP].
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utilities to allow small alternative energy facilities to interconnect with their
grid and requires the utilities to purchase power from these Qualifying
Facilities (“QFs”) at an “avoided cost” rate.370 In recent years, PURPA has
gained new life as falling renewable prices – combined with other federal and
state incentives – have reignited renewable QF development in states that do
not participate in competitive wholesale electricity markets, including in
North Carolina, Idaho, Utah, Georgia, Oklahoma, Minnesota, Nebraska, and
Oregon.371
States are generally charged with promulgating regulations that govern
key PURPA contract terms – including how avoided cost is calculated and
whether there needs to be a minimum contract length.372 States that offer long
term contracts and a favorable avoided cost methodology have seen dramatic
growth in PURPA-driven renewable development.373
Cooperatives that are not rate-regulated by a state utility commission,
however, can set those terms themselves, subject to factors identified by
FERC.374 Because Delta-Montrose is not rate-regulated by the Colorado
Public Utility Commission (“Colorado Commission”), it could set its own QF
contract terms, allowing it to effectively negotiate terms with QF providers.375
Delta-Montrose was at its 5% self-generation limit under its Tri-State
power supply contract when it was approached by a small, run-of-the-river
hydro provider.376 Since Delta-Montrose was interested in having this local,
zero-carbon resource added to its grid, Delta-Montrose petitioned FERC for a
declaratory judgment that PURPA’s must-purchase provisions superseded its

370. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2018). Avoided cost is the cost the utility would
otherwise have incurred to generate or purchase the incremental unit of power that it
is instead procuring from the qualifying facility – in economic terms, the marginal
cost. Regulations Implementing Section 210 of PURPA, 45 Fed. Reg. 12214, 12216
(Feb. 25, 1980).
371. Manussawee Sukunta, PURPA-Qualifying Capacity Increases, But It’s Still
a Small Portion of Added Renewables, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36912 [perma.cc/MW42-4EAN].
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 added § 210(m) that allows utilities to be exempted
from the must-purchase provisions if they are in organized wholesale or capacity
markets. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m) (2018); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 10958, § 1253(a) (2005).
372. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2020).
373. See DSIRE Insight Team, Three Trends in State PURPA Implementation,
DSIRE INSIGHT (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.dsireinsight.com/blog/2019/9/17/threetrends-in-state-purpa-implementation [perma.cc/JY22-32L9].
374. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2020).
375. Colorado law allows distribution cooperatives to exempt themselves from the
state’s Public Utilities Law through a vote of their membership. COLO. REV. STAT. §
40-9.5-103.
376. Order on Petition for Declaratory Order at 2, 151 FERC ¶ 61,238 (Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n 2015) (No. EL15-43-000). Percheron Power, LLC
sought to build a small, sub-1 MW hydroelectric project known as the South Canal
Drop 2 Project. Id.
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Tri-State power supply contract self-generation constraints. 377 In 2015 FERC
ruled that PURPA did indeed supersede power supply contract constraints.378
The following year, FERC ruled again in Delta-Montrose’s favor when TriState brought a related action, holding that Tri-State could not try to recover
otherwise “unrecovered fixed costs” from Delta-Montrose resulting from an
interconnection of a QF that exceeded the 5% self-generation limit.379
Initially, these rulings sparked hope that Tri-State member cooperatives
could use PURPA to authorize substantial local renewable power even if they
were at the 5% self-generation limit.
Subsequently, however, FERC granted a limited order of rehearing in
2016. FERC did not take any action on the matter for three years, creating
legal uncertainty.380 As this Article was about to be published, FERC ruled
that because it separately found that Tri-State had become subject to FERC’s
jurisdiction, the material facts in the matter had changed, and it was therefore
dismissing the request for rehearing and also vacating the underlying 2016
decision.381
In addition, in September of 2019, FERC issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking to amend PURPA regulations.382 Overall, the proposal would
allow states and non-regulated utilities greater discretion with regard to how
they would set avoided cost rates, likely reducing financial certainty for
QFs.383 The proposal does not address the issues raised in the Delta-

377. Id. at 1. DMEA also asked FERC to confirm that it could choose to negotiate
a rate for purchase with the QF and requested judgment on whether Tri-State “is a
public utility pursuant to Federal Power Act (FPA) sections 201(e) and (f)2, making
Delta Montrose’s wholesale requirements contract with Tri-State subject to sections
205 and 206 of the FPA.” Id.
378. Id. at 18 (citing Regulations Implementing Section 210 of PURPA, 45 Fed.
Reg. 12,214, 12,219 (Feb. 25, 1980)).
379. Order on Petition for Declaratory Order at 2, 155 FERC ¶ 61,269 (Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n 2016) (No. EL16-39-000).
380. See id. During a pending rehearing, the Commission’s initial order is in
effect. 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(e) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the
filing of a request for rehearing does not stay the Commission decision or order.”).
381. Order Dismissing Rehearing and Vacating Prior Order at 11, 170 FERC ¶
61,263 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 2020) (No. EL16-39-001). See discussion
infra at note 401.
382. PURPA Implementing Regulation Amendments, 168 FERC ¶ 61,184
(proposed Sep. 19, 2019).
383. Qualifying Facility Rates and Requirements; Implementation Issues Under
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,246, 53,247 (Oct.
4, 2019). Democratic FERC Commissioner Richard Glick wrote the proposal “would
effectively gut” PURPA in a dissent. Id. at 53,272–73. See also Catherine Morehouse,
FERC Proposal Would ‘Gut’ PURPA, Could Lower Rates Utilities Pay to Solar
Developers, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/FERC-
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Montrose-Tri-State proceedings, but it generally sides with incumbent powerproducing utilities over QF developers.384 As such, it adds uncertainty as to
whether the new Commission will revisit, and perhaps reverse, its prior
rulings in the Delta-Montrose-Tri-State dispute.
Taken together, these developments have dissuaded cooperatives or QFs
from using PURPA in Tri-State’s territory.385

5. Delta-Montrose and Two Other Coops Seek Colorado Utility
Commission Oversight over Exit Price
In 2018, Delta-Montrose next sought to follow Kit Carson’s example
and exit from Tri-State.386 According to DMEA court filings, Tri-State
calculated a “punitive” exit charge – reportedly much higher than Kit Carson’s
exit charge – and would not provide insight into its buyout-price-setting
methodology.387 As a result, Delta-Montrose filed a petition asking the
Colorado Commission to ensure that Tri-State offer Delta-Montrose a “just
and reasonable” exit fee offer.388 Delta-Montrose was supported in its request
by two other Tri-State members, United Power and the La Plata Electric
Association (“La Plata”); Colorado’s State Energy Office; and a majority of
the state’s legislators.389
Despite Tri-State’s opposition, the Commission ruled it did have
jurisdiction to regulate exit fees under its broad state Constitutional authority
granted to “regulate the . . . rates . . . and charges of every public utility
operating within Colorado.”390
Mid-way through the proceeding, Tri-State took the dramatic step of
seeking jurisdiction under FERC, a move that it claimed would have the effect
of pre-empting the jurisdiction of the Colorado Commission with regard to
regulation of exit fees.391 The Tri-State board voted to “add new members to
PURPA-changes-solar-competition-market-flexibility-Chatterjee/563369/
[perma.cc/J5DF-Q7NZ].
384. PURPA Implementing Regulation Amendments, supra note 382.
385. Distribution cooperatives and QF developers are unwilling to risk an adverse
future FERC decision that would subject them to fees for “unrecovered fixed costs.”
See 151 FERC ¶ 61,238, supra note 376.
386. See Formal Complaint, Delta-Montrose Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State, Generation
and Transmission Ass’n (Col. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2018) (No. 18F-0866E).
387. Id. at 1.
388. Id. at 13. Tri-State has maintained that the exit charge offered is confidential.
Id. at 4 n.6.
389. CATES & FEASTER, supra note 323, at 8.
390. Interim Decision Denying Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint at 5, DeltaMontrose Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State Generation and Transmission, Inc., (Col. Pub. Util.
Comm’n 2018) (No. 18F-0866E).
391. Tri-State Board of Directors to Place Cooperative Under FERC Rate
Regulation, TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION ASS’N (July 9, 2019),
https://www.tristate.coop/tri-state-board-directors-place-cooperative-under-ferc-rateregulation [perma.cc/R8C6-Q39K].
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the wholesale cooperative” that were not RUS borrowers, which it argued
would have the effect of “eliminat[ing] the Federal Power Act exception” that
exempts entities owned solely by RUS borrowers from FERC jurisdiction.392
In its press release, Tri-State said that the action would lead to “lower costs
and greater efficiency” by eliminating “inconsistent rate treatment across the
states” – and particularly in Colorado and New Mexico.393 Delta-Montrose
decried the action, stating that “[t]he sole purpose appears to be an attempt to
evade Colorado law by forum shopping.”394
After the FERC filing, Delta-Montrose reached a settlement agreement
with Tri-State as to an exit price on July 15, 2019.395 The buy-out price was
$62.5 million, and the exit was to be concluded by July 2020.396
On October 4, 2019, FERC rejected Tri-State’s initial bid to become
subject to its wholesale rate jurisdiction, finding that Tri-State had not
submitted sufficient detail on its costs.397 On December 23, 2019, Tri-State
tried again, filing a petition for a declaratory order that it was subject to
FERC’s jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act and filing a new rate
tariff.398
In November of 2019, La Plata and United Power followed DeltaMontrose’s example. These two cooperatives – respectively Tri-State’s
largest and third-largest members – contribute 22% of the power supply
cooperatives revenues.399 Both filed complaints asking the Colorado

392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Colorado Co-op Sues to Block Tri-State’s Move to FERC Regulation, State
Lawmakers Also Concerned, EUCI (June 9, 2019), https://www.euci.com/coloradoco-op-sues-to-block-tri-states-move-to-ferc-regulation-state-lawmakers-alsoconcerned/ [perma.cc/9XT6-F4B9] (quoting DMEA’s CEO Jason Bronec).
395. Id.
396. Id.; Katharhynn Heidelberg, Signed, Sealed, Delivered: DMEA Poised for
$62.5M July Exit from Tri-State, MONTROSE DAILY PRESS (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.montrosepress.com/signed-sealed-delivered-dmea-poised-for-62-5mjuly-exit-from-tri-state-updated/article_36572b32-7b71-11ea-a59b13d78c2b2c22.html [perma.cc/8Q42-Y2K3].
397. Order Rejecting Filings without Prejudice, 169 FERC ¶ 61,012 at 8–9 (Fed.
Energy Regulation Comm’n 2019) (No. ER19-2440-000, et al.).
398. Notice of Petition for Declaratory Order; Tri-State Generation and
Transmission Association, Inc., 85 Fed. Reg. 506 (Jan. 1, 2020); Tri-State Generation
and Transmission Association, Inc. Initial Rate Filing of FERC Electric Tariff Volume
No. 1 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Dec. 23, 2016) (No. ER20-676) (second TriState initial rate filing).
399. See Joint Submission of La Plata Electric Association and United Power, Inc.
on the Issue of the Commission’s Jurisdiction Over This Exit Charge Proceeding,
(Col. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2019) (Nos. 19F-0620E and 19F-0621E).
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Commission to set a “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” exit charge.400
Tri-State is again contesting the action, arguing in part that the Colorado
Commission does not have jurisdiction because of its FERC applications.401
In March 2020, shortly before publication of this Article, FERC ruled
that Tri-State’s addition of a for-profit, non-cooperative member did bring
Tri-State under FERC’s jurisdiction.402 FERC also held that its authority did
extend to overseeing Tri-State’s exit charges and invited Tri-State to file a
methodology for calculating exit fees.403 At the same time, FERC found that
its authority did not necessarily preempt the Colorado Commission from
concurrently exercising oversight over exit fees.404 After the FERC decision,
Tri-State announced a new public policy for calculating exit fees that would
be based on “mak[ing] whole” the remaining distribution cooperative utility
members in regard to any financial impacts caused by the exit of a member.405
Tri-State announced that it planned on filing this policy with FERC for
approval.
As of this writing, the La Plata and United Power exit charge
proceedings are ongoing.
One result of La Plata’s and United Power’s complaints was that S&P
Global Ratings downgraded Tri-State’s credit rating from an A to A- and
issued a negative outlook for the future.406 S&P pointed to the two exit charge
complaints as the immediate cause for the downgrade and identified member

400. Joint Response of La Plata Electric Association, Inc. and United Power, Inc.
Clarifying Requested Relief in Response to Decision No. C19-0955-I at 2 (Col. Pub.
Util. Comm’n 2019) (Nos. 19F-0620E and 19F-0621E). La Plata alleged that TriState unjustly refused to provide an exit charge, and United Power alleged that the exit
charged offered by Tri-State was unjust. Id. at 2–3.
401. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association’s Brief on Jurisdiction
and Request for Hearing at 9, (Col. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2019) (No. 19F-0620E)
(arguing Colorado Commission’s jurisdiction is “entirely preempted” by FERC.).
402. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petition, 170 FERC ¶ 61,224 at
82–92 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 2020) (No. EL20-16-000).
403. Id. at 116–21.
404. “A ruling by the Colorado PUC on those complaints would not be preempted
unless and until such ruling conflicts with a Commission-approved tariff or agreement
that establishes how Tri-State’s exit charges will be calculated.” Id. at 116–21. As of
the writing of this article, Tri-State was requesting rehearing on the issue of whether
the Colorado Commission was preempted from exercising oversight on exit fees.
Request for Rehearing Limited to the Issue of Preemption, 170 FERC ¶ 61,224 (2020)
(Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 2020) (No. EL20-16-000).
405. See Press Release, Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass’n, Tri-State
Takes Significant Step to Increase Member Flexibility, Sets Contract Termination
Payment Methodology, (April 9, 2020), https://www.tristategt.org/tri-state-takessignificant-step-increase-member-flexibility-sets-contract-termination-payment
[perma.cc/CSL4-KD6A].
406. S&P Global Ratings Issues New Ratings for Tri-State, TRI-STATE (Nov. 19,
2019), https://www.tristategt.org/sp-global-ratings-issues-new-ratings-tri-state [perm
a.cc/YE8Q-MKLT].
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dissatisfaction, high rates, and high reliance on coal-fired power plants as
some of the reasons for its negative longer-term outlook.407

6. Colorado, New Mexico 2019 Legislation
The unrest by Kit Carson, Delta-Montrose, United Power, La Plata, and
other Tri-State cooperatives in Colorado and New Mexico have also led to
important legislative developments.
In 2019, Colorado passed legislation that subjected Tri-State to an IRP
filing requirement overseen by the Colorado Commission.408 Previously, TriState had been required to submit an IRP under a settlement agreement but
was not required to have the plan approved by the Commission.409 The
legislation clarified the authority of the Commission to require a more
rigorous process.410
Colorado and New Mexico also both passed ambitious climate or clean
energy laws in the 2019 legislative session.411 Colorado’s H.B. 19-1261
directs the state air quality body to promulgate GHG regulations to meet
economy-wide GHG reduction goals.412 The law allows utilities the option of
developing their own “clean energy plans” for how to achieve an 80%
reduction in GHG emissions associated with their retail sales by 2030 from
2005 levels.413 Utilities that receive the Colorado Commission’s approval of
such plans and achieve the planned reductions will not be required to achieve
further reductions by the state air quality body, nor will they be subject to
additional direct, nonadministrative costs, until after 2030.414 The legislation
explicitly allows distribution cooperatives to submit such plans.415
New Mexico’s Energy Transition Act extends the state’s RPS to require
that distribution cooperatives supply 50% of electricity from renewable
resources by 2030 and 100% from zero-carbon resources by 2050.416
407. Id.
408. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-134 (2019).
409. Joe Smyth, Colorado Public Utilities Commission Will Oversee Tri-State
Resource Planning, CLEAN COOPERATIVE (May 7, 2019), https://www.cleancooperati
ve.com/news/colorado-public-utilities-commission-will-oversee-tri-state-resourceplanning [perma.cc/6862-EWQA].
410. Id.
411. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-105(1)(e)(II) (2019); S.B. 489, 54th Leg.,
1st Sess., § 26 (N.M. 2019).
412. § 25-7-105 (1)(e)(II).
413. § 22-7-105(1)(e)(VIII)(B).
414. § 25-7-105 (1)(e)(VIII)(C).
415. § 25-7-105 (1)(e)(VIII)(F).
416. S.B. 489, 54th Leg., 1st Sess., § 26 (N.M. 2019). In 2050, distribution
cooperatives are required to achieve both an 80% renewable and 100% zero-carbon
resource standard “provided that: 1) achieving the target is technically feasible; 2) the
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In both states, this means that Tri-State’s member cooperatives will
become subject to some of the most ambitious GHG reduction or renewable
energy requirements in the nation. Because Tri-State is responsible for
supplying at least 95% of the wholesale power to its member cooperatives,
these requirements effectively fall on Tri-State as well.417
Although Tri-State has argued that its attempts to secure FERC
jurisdiction preempt the Colorado Commission’s authority to establish an exit
charge, it has not disputed Colorado or New Mexico’s authority to subject its
member cooperatives to resource planning, renewable energy, or GHG
mandates.418

7. Tri-State’s Coal Power Plant Closures and Responsible Energy
Plan
Starting in July of 2019, Tri-State announced that it would be developing
a new energy plan.419 The announcement followed the hiring of a new CEO,
Duane Highley.420 Tri-State unveiled its “Responsible Energy Plan” in
January of 2020.421
The plan announced that Tri-State was committing to retire its two
remaining coal-fired power plants in Colorado and New Mexico.422 The
power supply cooperative will close the 253 MW Escalante Generating
Station in New Mexico by the end of 2020 and will close the 1,285 MW Craig
Station and the associated Colowyo coal mine in Colorado by 2030.423 Tri-

rural electric cooperative is able to provide reliable electric service while
implementing the target; and 3) implementing the target shall not cause electric service
to become unaffordable.” Id.
417. TRI-STATE 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 311, at 39.
418. “FERC regulation will not affect resource planning, carbon reduction or
renewable energy regulation in the states in which Tri-State operates.” Tri-State Board
of Directors to Place Cooperative Under FERC Rate Regulation, supra note 390.
419. See Tri-State Announces Transformative Responsible Energy Plan, TRISTATE (July 17, 2019), https://www.tristate.coop/tri-state-announces-transformativeresponsible-energy-plan [perma.cc/K6AU-X3RR].
420. See Darrell Proctor, Tri-State Announces Duane Highley as Next Chief
Executive Officer, POWER (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.powermag.com/pressreleases/tri-state-announces-duane-highley-as-next-chief-executive-officer/
[perma.cc/Y7TD-6RAZ].
421. Tri-State Announces Transformative Responsible Energy Plan Actions to
Advance Cooperative Clean Energy, TRI-STATE (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.powermag.com/press-releases/tri-state-announces-duane-highley-asnext-chief-executive-officer/ [perma.cc/E593-FNHL].
422. Tri-State Announces Retirement of All Coal Generation in Colorado and New
Mexico, TRI-STATE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://tristate.coop/tri-state-announces-retirementall-coal-generation-colorado-and-new-mexico [perma.cc/865B-V3Y2].
423. Tri-State reported that the closures would affect 600 power plant and mine
employees. Id.
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State also retired its 100 MW Nucla coal-fired power plant in September
2019.424
In its plan Tri-State also committed to add 1 gigawatt (“GW”) of
additional renewable energy capacity to its portfolio by 2024.425 It also touted
a recent change in the power supply cooperative’s policies that would allow
member distribution cooperatives to “build community solar to serve an
additional 2 megawatts or 2% of their consumption” above the 5% selfgeneration limit.426 (As this Article was about to be published, Tri-State
further announced a process by which cooperatives could seek to additionally
increase self-generation, with interested cooperatives being able to self-supply
in aggregate up to 10% of Tri-State’s system peak demand.)427
The Plan was announced by Highley in a press conference with Colorado
Governor Jared Polis.428 Highley said that he hoped the plan would give
member cooperatives considering exiting Tri-State a “reason to think about
staying.”429
As of this writing, it is not clear whether the plan will be enough to
satisfy disgruntled member cooperatives.
In sum, climate change will require near total decarbonization on the part
of electric utilities, including cooperatives. A combination of economic
factors, government subsidies, and state and federal regulations have caused
utilities to start this shift to a low-carbon economy. Cooperatives, however,
are lagging behind in this shift. They own more coal-fired power plants and
have been slower to close these power plants and to add renewable energy.
As the Tri-State example shows, some of the distribution cooperatives
that have been most eager to accelerate this shift to a low-carbon electricity
system have been stymied by their power supply cooperative. Until recently
Tri-State was focused on building a large new coal plant and aggressively
resisted efforts by distribution cooperatives to add significant renewable
generation to their grids. After the successful exit of two cooperatives,
exploration of exit by two additional cooperatives, new state legislation
imposing dramatic clean energy and resource planning mandates, and a

424. Judith Kohler, Tri-State Officially Retires Nucla Coal-Fired Power Plant
Well Ahead of Planned 2022 Closure, DENVER POST (Sep. 21, 2019),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/09/21/tri-state-closes-nucla-coal-plant/
[perma.cc/CH2Z-ZR5D].
425. Tri-State Announces Transformative Responsible Energy Plan Actions to
Advance Cooperative Clean Energy, supra note 419.
426. TRI-STATE, RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN 5 (2020).
427. Press Release, Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass’n, supra note 405.
428. Governor Jared Polis, More Renewable Energy in Colorado, FACEBOOK
(2020), https://www.facebook.com/jaredpolis/videos/558653254862714/ [perma.cc/9
C84-TPEP].
429. Id.
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downgrade of its credit rating, Tri-State has made a significant turn towards
clean energy.

IV. COOP OVERSIGHT IS NOT ADEQUATE TO ADDRESS CLIMATE
CHANGE
Cooperatives emerged at the dawn of utility regulation. At the time, they
avoided regulation because they were perceived as largely self-regulating and
because the REA played an oversight role.
Addressing climate change, however, will require cooperatives to
navigate a dramatic shift in generation resources in a time of significant
technological, regulatory, and economic uncertainty.
This Part argues that the current regulatory scheme will not adequately
prompt a rapid and efficient shift to a low-carbon electricity system. Section
A discusses why the benefits of the cooperative organizational form will not
carryover as well to the climate challenge as they did to electrifying rural
America. Section B details why the separation of ownership and control is a
particular problem for U.S. cooperatives and how manager incentives and
organizational inertia conflict with prudent planning to transition to a lowcarbon electricity system. Section C discusses how key decarbonization
strategies – distributed energy resources, energy efficiency, and increasing
reliance on energy markets – threaten to destabilize the existing model of
power supply and distribution cooperative relationships. Section D identifies
the lack of rigorous resource planning oversight as a key gap in the
cooperative regulatory scheme. Section E concludes by discussing the
implications for cooperatives of failing to prudently plan for a low-carbon
future.

A. Not All Benefits of the Coop Form Transfer to the Clean Energy
Transition
The success of cooperatives in electrifying rural America can be
attributed in part to the benefits of the cooperative organizational form.
Transitioning to a low-carbon electricity system presents a somewhat similar
challenge, and some of the benefits of the cooperative form will again prove
useful, particularly the cost savings provided by the vertical integration and
non-profit status of cooperatives. But the challenge of low-carbon transition
also differs in important ways from electrification, particularly because many
of the benefits of acting on climate are diffused and deferred. Where rural
electrification benefitted from substantial in-kind contributions by
cooperative member owners, it is not clear that low-carbon transition will reap
the same benefit.
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Scholars such as Henry Hansmann, Peter Molk, and Melissa Scanlan
have identified diverse benefits and drawbacks of the cooperative as an
organizational form.430
One of the chief benefits is that rural electricity cooperatives reduce costs
to consumers.431 As consumer cooperatives, they vertically integrate the firm
and end-use consumers and therefore eliminate the profit that would be
extracted by a for-profit distribution utility (or a distribution-utility
component of a vertically-integrated utility).432 Where a distribution
cooperative purchases wholesale electricity from a power supply cooperative
or a federal power entity, they also eliminate profit that would otherwise be
extracted by a for-profit generation utility (or generation-utility
component).433 These cost savings were an important factor in the success of
cooperative rural electrification because they made it more feasible to string
wires in sparsely populated, poor communities.
A second important benefit of the cooperative structure is that the act of
ownership can “induce desirable activity by those patrons that is not replicable
through market contracting or through ownership by investors.”434 It is clear
from numerous reports that the member-owners of new rural cooperatives put
tremendous energy and effort into establishing their rural electricity
cooperatives.435 For example, when cooperatives were first getting organized,
future member-owners recruited members, developed the organization, and
plotted power-lines, all without pay.436 These volunteers would make house
calls to convince those farmers who were skeptical, recognizing the
importance of having the largest number of users along a power line.437
Moreover, future member owners donated most of the easements for power
lines in early cooperatives.438 These contributions can be attributed to the
collective-ownership nature of the enterprise and to the dramatic improvement
in quality-of-life that electrification provided.439

430. HANSMANN, supra note 84; Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives,
88 TUL. L. REV. 899 (2013); MELISSA K. SCANLAN, COOPERATING FOR A LIVABLE
PLANET (forthcoming Yale University Press 2021) (based on draft of forthcoming
book shared by the author).
431. Molk, supra note 430, at 912.
432. Id.
433. Id. This is not a reduction of economic costs – it is a transfer of wealth from
shareholders to consumers. They “accomplish vertical integration” by “coupling the
firm with [a] . . . downstream (consumer) process.” Id.
434. Id. at 914.
435. See PENCE & DAHL, supra note 108, at 83.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 87.
439. Id.
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There were other factors that contributed to rural electrification. These
include the technical assistance provided by the REA from the outset, as well
as the subsidized interest rate provided to cooperatives between 1944 and
1973.440 Yet the cooperative form itself provided some of the benefits that
helped the rural electrification effort succeed.
Decarbonizing the rural electricity sector is in some ways a similar
challenge to electrifying rural America in the first place. Rural communities
were more expensive to electrify because of dispersed living patterns; those
same living patterns make it more expensive to implement some lower-carbon
strategies like energy efficiency.441 Rural communities were also challenging
to electrify because residents were poorer and therefore were expected to be
less able to afford new technologies. The same remains true today.
But shifting to a lower carbon grid will also pose challenges that are
different from electrification. In some cases, the benefits of the cooperative
form may not aid in addressing the climate change challenges to the same
degree they helped electrify rural America.
First, shifting to a lower-carbon electricity system will not always
improve the quality of life for cooperative member owners with the same kind
of immediacy and universality that electrification did. That is not to say that
decarbonizing the electricity system won’t benefit rural Americans. Improved
energy efficiency will reduce bills and improve the quality of housing for
those who receive such services. Distributed wind and solar, coupled with
battery storage, will make rural distribution grids more resilient and reliable
in the long term. And acting quickly to decarbonize the grid will reduce the
severity of harmful climate impacts. Yet many of these benefits are reductions
in future harms and, in some cases, reductions of harms far in the future. It is
well established that “people discount future utility and put off long-term
investments in favor of short-term return.”442 Where these benefits are
immediate – for example bill reductions from energy efficiency or rooftop
solar – they are generally not universal. There are important exceptions. For
example, Kit Carson’s exit from Tri-State and shift to cleaner energy is
projected to reduce rates for all member owners in the next 10 years.443
Absent such clear benefits, however, it should be expected that there would
be less support for decarbonization compared to electrification because the
benefits will either be further off or will not accrue to all cooperative memberowners.

440. Id.
441. MARY SHOEMAKER ET AL., REACHING RURAL COMMUNITIES WITH ENERGY
EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECONOMY 10
(2018) (“Delivering and scaling energy efficiency programs is particularly
challenging for utilities serving rural communities because low population density
may mean higher program cost per capita.”).
442. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1174 (2008).
443. In some cases there may be universal short term benefits. See supra Part
II.B.3.
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Second, polling shows that rural residents are somewhat less likely to
believe that climate change is occurring or caused by human activity than
urban counterparts.444 To a lesser but still significant degree, rural residents
are also less likely to support requiring increased renewable energy.445 It is
important not to overstate such findings. In the past five years, belief that
climate change is happening has grown by 11 percentage points – 73% of
Americans overall now believe climate change is happening and 69% are
worried about it.446 Moreover, not all rural communities are the same, and
some cooperative service territories include suburban areas. Nevertheless,
there likely is somewhat less support for taking action to address climate
change in cooperative service territories.
During the 1930s, ranchers and farmers lined up to plunk down $5 and
donate an easement to join a cooperative and receive electric light for the first
time. Given that the benefits of shifting to a cleaner electricity system are
often more distant and diffuse – and that addressing climate change may be
less of a compelling rationale in cooperative service territories – it seems
likely that fewer cooperative member owners would be willing to take similar
action in this context.
The cooperative form will still provide benefits in addressing climate
change. The non-profit status and vertical integration of cooperatives will
reduce costs in the transition. Shelley Welton has also argued that many of
the choices that will need to be made in the transition are public policy
decisions that are more appropriately made by democratically accountable
institutions, including cooperatives, as opposed to for-profit utilities.447 And
in a forthcoming book, Melissa K. Scanlan highlights the value of
cooperatives in transitioning to a low-carbon economy, including case studies
of electricity cooperatives in Spain and the United States. She argues that not
only can cooperatives be successful organizational models for the transition
to a low-carbon electricity system, the cooperative form provides important

444. Belief that global warming is happening is “signiﬁcantly lower” in rural
counties than in the nation’s largest cities. Howe et al., supra note 27, at 600.
445. See Yale Climate Opinion Maps 2018, YALE PROGRAM CLIMATE CHANGE
COMM. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizationsdata/ycom-us-2018/ [perma.cc/7C76-JL58].
446. Abel Gustafson et al., A Growing Majority of Americans Think Global
Warming is Happening and are Worried, YALE PROGRAM CLIMATE CHANGE COMM.
(Feb. 21, 2019), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/a-growingmajority-of-americans-think-global-warming-is-happening-and-are-worried/
[perma.cc/P345-446U].
447. See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 270 (2017) (“In
debates over public/private boundaries, commentators often argue that decisions
involving open-ended policy choices with broad public consequences belong with
government”).
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complementary benefits such as the opportunity to reinvest surplus revenue
into the community instead of siphoning such revenue to shareholders.448
Although the cooperative form continues to provide benefits, it is not
clear how many member owners will replicate the extra-transactional
“desirable activity” that helped make cooperative electrification such a broad
success.

B. Coop Managers Often Have Incentives to Grow Size and Revenue
Whereas early utility regulation was chiefly concerned with preventing
exploitative profits, the energy crises of the 1980s underscored that in some
circumstances, for-profit utilities will make imprudent choices that eventually
harm both shareholders and rate payers. Skewed management incentives and
institutional biases can drive poor resource planning, especially in times of
drastic change and uncertainty.
Prudent long-term resource planning by utilities will be the central
challenge in shifting to a low-carbon electricity system. At least some of the
institutional pressures bearing on both distribution and power supply
cooperatives, however, may skew cooperative responses to the climate
challenge.
First, cooperative managers – particularly of power supply cooperatives
– have an institutional incentive to grow the budget and size of the
cooperative, and this incentive favors maintaining a fossil-fuel heavy
generation portfolio.
A longstanding criticism of the cost-of-service regulatory model for forprofit utilities is that these utilities have an incentive to overbuild utility
infrastructure to receive a rate-of-return on a higher level of capital investment
(referred to as the Avery-Johnson effect).449 This is the reason that utilities in
cost-of-service regulatory models would prefer to build their own generation
instead of securing long-term PPAs agreements that do not provide them with
a rate-of-return on capital investment.450
Because cooperatives have no profit motive, most early cooperative
proponents did not believe that cooperatives had a similar incentive to
overbuild infrastructure.
Yet some of the insights from organizational theory and public choice
theory of the Niskanen variety can help explain why managers of non-profit
power supply cooperatives may also be motivated to increase capital
infrastructure.
Organization theorists have long focused on the problem of the
separation of ownership and control in a corporation. This refers to the
differences between the interests of the owners and the managers of a firm,
and how to use corporate governance mechanisms to counter these

448. SCANLAN, supra note 430.
449. Boyd, supra note 31, at 1652.
450. Id. at 1653–54.
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differences.451 Jeter, Thomas, and Wells argue in their 2018 article that
cooperatives are particularly susceptible to this problem because they have
“weak corporate governance structures” that prevent effective or efficient
monitoring of cooperative managers.452 “Cooperatives fail because of bad
boards of directors and uninformed, passive members. Member apathy is
rampant, and only a small fraction of members attend annual meetings to cast
their votes to elect directors.”453 They contrast cooperative governance to
modern corporate governance, which “thrive[s] on diligent boards of directors
acting without conflicts of interest on a fully informed basis and subject to
close monitoring by outside investors.”454 In short, cooperative managers are
given more deference by their boards, and their decisions are subject to less
rigorous scrutiny than those of for-profit utilities.455
William Niskanen argued in 1971 that bureaucrats seek to maximize
their agency budgets as a way to maximize their utility.456 While few
contemporary scholars accept Niskanen’s simplistic model that budget
maximization is deterministic, it is broadly accepted that budgets “are among
the things agencies seek to maximize – even if their utility functions are a
great deal more complicated than the highly stylized Niskanen model would
suggest.”457
This dynamic plausibly explains some of the behavior of power supply
cooperatives. For example, Tri-State managers are highly paid executives that
likely have an incentive to increase Tri-State’s revenues and size even though
Tri-State is not a for-profit firm.458 Tri-State’s recently-retired CEO earned
just over $1 million in total compensation in 2017, and four other senior
executives earned over $600,000.459 The Tri-State CEO’s base salary is set
by the Board and is based on performance and “national salary data” for
“positions with similar responsibilities.”460 There are no fixed performance
incentives for the Tri-State CEO, for example, no bonus for managing to

451. The seminal starting point is ADOLF A. JR. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 (1991).
452. Jeter et al., supra note 3, at 396.
453. Id. at 396–97.
454. Id. at 397.
455. Id. at 397–98.
456. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
37 (2d ed. 1974).
457. Christopher C. Jr. DeMuth & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the Age
of Executive Government, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555, 556 (2016).
458. See Tri-State Generation Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 326, at 94.
459. Id. at 96.
460. Id. at 97.
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reduce the wholesale electricity rate while providing reliable service.461 Other
cooperatives have similarly stated that they index salaries to cooperatives of
similar “size.”462
Hence, the Tri-State CEO has a personal financial incentive to grow the
size of Tri-State as an organization, even though that may not be the most
prudent course of action for Tri-State’s member-owners.
Research on the non-profit hospital sector has found similar incentives.
A 2013 Kaiser Health News report found that private, non-profit hospitals
were increasingly pegging management pay incentives to increased volume
of service and revenue growth, not on quality-of-service.463
These manager incentives to grow organizational size are coupled with
a board of directors that is not in a strong position to provide oversight.
Almost none of the current Tri-State board members have formal training or
experience in the electricity sector.464 Many are farmers and ranchers.465
Moreover, board members may feel beholden to power supply cooperative
managers thanks to generous perks such as a $500 per diem for board
meetings, in addition to travel expenses.466
Finally, literature on institutional governance points out that non-profit
organizations historically exhibit “high degrees of inertia and path
dependency.”467 Organizational theorists highlight that in non-profits, board
members have weaker incentive signals and may rely more on “deep-seated
dispositions” that combine to maintain a preference for the status quo.468

C. Shifting to a Low-Carbon System will Likely Require Disrupting
the Power Supply – Distribution Coop Model
Prudent action to prepare for a carbon-constrained world will likely
require generation-owning cooperatives to close fossil-fuel fired power plants,
contract out for renewable generation, and reduce wholesale power sales – all

461. Id. “[S]ubstantially all of our monetary compensation to our executive
officers is provided in the form of base salary.” The Board does have the discretion
to provide bonuses. Id.
462. Terence Corrigan, How Much Pay is the Right Amount for Electric Co-op
Managers?, SHELBYVILLE TIMES-GAZETTE (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.tg.com/story/2541460.html [perma.cc/YDE7-LCRQ].
463. Jay Hancock, Hospital CEO Bonuses Reward Volume and Growth, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (June 6, 2013), https://khn.org/news/hospital-ceo-compensationmainbar/ [perma.cc/GB4X-MTKB].
464. Tri-State Generation Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 326, at 87–91.
465. Id. at 90–94.
466. Id. at 98. On average, board members received just over $19,000 per person
in 2017. Id. at 100. The Chairman and President received $167,447, based on an
expectation that he or she is available for Tri-State business 260 days a year. Id.
467. HELMUT K. ANHEIER, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, MANAGEMENT,
POLICY 517 (2014).
468. Id.
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actions that run counter to the management incentive to increase
organizational size and budget.
Historically, power supply cooperatives sought to ensure a sufficient
power supply for the needs of member distribution cooperatives and to keep
the wholesale power costs as low as possible.
When there was a growing electricity demand, stable fuel costs, and
growing economies of scale, achieving these goals was simple. Power supply
cooperatives would build sequentially larger power plants to meet growing
demand, and the larger power plants would produce cheaper power. This
model neatly aligned with the financial incentives of managers to grow
revenues and organizational size.
Now, however, the fundamentals of the electricity business have
changed. Electricity demand is flat.469 Legacy coal plants, which were once
the cheapest source of baseload power, are now more expensive to run than
natural gas plants due to the declining cost of natural gas.470 Wind and solar
power plants have become, in turn, cheaper to build than natural gas and have
no fuel costs at all.471
Utility managers also face substantial regulatory uncertainties. The
Trump Administration has significantly weakened federal GHG standards for
existing power plants, but most utility managers expect significant carbon
regulations in the future.472 Most states already have renewable electricity
mandates, but they vary in their levels of ambition. Several states have
recently increased targets; others are likely to follow in future years.473 In
short, utility managers know that substantial carbon or clean energy
regulations of some sort are likely in the future, but they don’t know what
these regulations will look like or when they will come into effect.

469. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL, TABLE 2.2. SALES
DIRECT USE OF ELECTRICITY TO ULTIMATE CUSTOMERS, available at
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_02_02.html
[perma.cc/F96MYNJT] (showing little change in electricity sales from 2008 to 2018).
470. Elizabeth Weise, On World Environment Day, Everything You Know About
Energy in the US Might Be Wrong, USA TODAY (JUNE 4, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/06/04/climate-change-coal-now-moreexpensive-than-wind-solar-energy/1277637001/ [perma.cc/B2ND-UC3K].
471. Id.
472. Gavin Bade, SEU 2019 Survey: Uncertainty Mounts in the Clean Energy
Transition, UTILITY DIVE (February 26, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/seu
-2019-survey-uncertainty-mounts-in-the-clean-energy-transition/549214/ [perma.cc/
T4W7-C975] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
473. Galen Barbose, U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards: 2019 Annual Status
Update 48 (2019), https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/us-renewables-portfoliostandards-2 [perma.cc/YDW6-872P].
AND
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While there can be cost benefits to shifting to low-carbon resources, the
strategies available to power supply cooperatives can threaten the traditional
power supply-distribution cooperative model.
First, transitioning away from coal generation will likely be more painful
for many cooperatives than for for-profit utilities. Coal-fired power plants are
now more expensive to run than natural gas power plants and also more
carbon-intensive.474 In some cases, it is cheaper to retire those coal-fired
power plants and to replace them with renewable energy than to continue to
run the plants.
However, in many cases, cooperatives are still paying off debt from
capital investments into these power plants because the power plants have not
reached the end of their planned “useful life.”475
For-profit utilities are also confronting such “stranded assets,” but
utilities in cost-of-service jurisdictions have the potential to recover at least
some of the costs of paying off the debt from ratepayers. To the degree that
ratepayers cover these stranded costs, the “owners” receive some protection
from the losses related to these stranded assets.476 With favorable PUC
treatment, shareholders may have less concern about retiring coal plants.
Where PUCs can be expected to grant some rate recovery for stranded assets,
there is less concern about a potential loss for shareholders and therefore less
opposition to retiring power plants that have not reached the end of their useful
life.477
For cooperatives, however, the owners and the customers are the same.
If there are business losses resulting from decisions to invest in coal, the losses
come at the expense of member-owners, either through losses of patronage
capital or in the form of higher rates.
Second, adding renewable energy to a power supply cooperative’s
portfolio can also run counter to a cooperative’s institutional incentives.
Because a tax-exempt power supply cooperative cannot take direct
advantage of federal renewable energy tax credits, they are more likely to
procure renewable energy through PPAs.478 In a PPA, a separate entity that
is capable of benefitting from the renewable energy tax credit would own the
474. Weise, supra note 470.
475. ERIK HATLESTAD ET AL., RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 2.0: THE TRANSITION TO A
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 2 (2019), https://www.cfra.org/publications/RuralElectrifi
cation [perma.cc/GZ49-GL85].
476. SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE: THE LAW OF
MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING, AND JURISDICTION 236 (2013). Utility commissions
may exclude “imprudent” costs from a utilities rate base. Id.
477. When a utility is able to impose costs of stranded assets on captive ratepayers
instead of investors, it raises significant equity concerns that are important but beyond
the scope of this article. The point here is that a profit-driven utility in a cost-ofservice jurisdiction has the potential of shifting at least some losses from shareholders
to ratepayers.
478. Bob Gibson, Electric Co-ops Get Creative to Finance Solar, SMART ELEC.
POWER ALLIANCE (FEB. 5, 2015), https://sepapower.org/knowledge/electric-co-opsget-creative-to-finance-solar/ [perma.cc/XK3K-2G9W].
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renewable resources and would sell the energy produced to the cooperative.479
Under such an arrangement, a cooperative would not increase its assets or
personnel – though a PPA will still increase the quantity of wholesale
electricity sales. To the extent that the cooperative management team’s
compensation is based in part on the utility’s assets and personnel, a power
supply utility will have an institutional preference for maintaining ownership
of existing generation assets instead of replacing some of that capacity
through a PPA.
An even more threatening issue is the potential of replacing electricity
generated or procured by a power supply cooperative with renewable
electricity generated at the local level.
For nearly one hundred years, centralized power plants provided
electricity to all consumers. Now, however, a whole suite of community –
and customer – scale technologies like rooftop solar, battery storage, demand
response, and in the future, electric vehicles, are providing electricity and
other services to the grid. These distributed energy resources (“DERs”) are
aided by advances in information and communication technologies such as
smart grids and smart appliances. Collectively, the use of these technologies
is growing rapidly.
DERs already play a significant role in decarbonizing the electricity
system. Some DERs themselves provide renewable energy or reduce energy
usage. This includes rooftop and community solar, which accounted for 11%
of new electricity capacity in 2015.480 It also includes demand response
services, which refers to business processes or technologies that can reduce
power consumption at times of peak grid usage – imagine electric vehicles
that postpone charging to times of lower demand. DERs can also provide
other types of services that are valuable to a grid that increasingly relies on
intermittent renewable resources, such as the storage of energy for when the
wind stops blowing, and the regulation of electric frequency and voltage.
Although it is not clear yet how large of a role DERs will play in the
low-carbon grid of the future, their role is already substantial and growing.481
It is clear, however, that customers and communities like the benefits of
DERs. DER technologies allow consumers to have more control over
interactions with the electricity grid. Communities and businesses seek to
install their own renewable electricity generation resources to reduce or
eliminate electricity payments, to increase their resilience in the face of
479. Solar Power Purchase Agreements, SOLAR ENERGY INFO. ASS’N,
https://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-power-purchase-agreements
[perma.cc/SCS6-HVUE] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
480. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, UTILITY OF THE FUTURE: AN MIT ENERGY
INITIATIVE RESPONSE TO AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 3 (2016).
481. See Lorenzo Kristov, Paul De Martini & Jeffrey D. Taft, A Tale of Two
Visions: Designing a Decentralized Transactive Electric System, 14 IEEE POWER AND
ENERGY MAG. 63, 63 (2016).
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potential grid failures in the future, to achieve clean energy or climate goals,
and to promote local economic development and jobs.
One of the consequences of increased use of DERs is that there are many
new actors in the electricity sector, creating new types of competition in both
competitive and regulated markets. In states with competitive wholesale or
retail electricity markets, regional grid operators or PUCs are finding ways to
allow these actors to compete in the marketplace. As Jonas Monast has
described, even in traditionally regulated states, utility commissions are
finding ways to allow these actors to compete with vertically integrated
utilities within the bounds of a traditional rate regulation model.482
These changes threaten many traditional utility business models because
customers can now become power generators themselves.483 This reduces
demand for electricity from traditional utilities.484
For the same reasons, these changes also threaten the power supply
distribution cooperative model. The power supply cooperative relies on
steady purchases of power from distribution cooperatives to pay for its fixed
costs, including its debt payments, and seeks to generate all of the electricity
that the distribution cooperatives need to provide for their member owners.
Reductions in electricity demand from distribution cooperatives – whether
because of energy efficiency improvements or customer-sited generation
resources – reduce overall wholesale electricity purchases from the power
supply cooperative. If there is enough of a reduction in electricity demand, it
will require the cooperative to raise rates to maintain the revenue it needs to
meet its fixed costs.485
Power supply cooperatives could and do seek to sell their excess
electricity on wholesale markets to other customers, not just to their member
owners. For example, last year, Tri-State sold 10% of its electricity to nonmembers.486 Yet for a utility like Tri-State, which has high wholesale
electricity costs because of its coal-heavy portfolio and level of debt, its
wholesale electricity prices may not be competitive in the market.487
All of these changes that reduce revenue or increase costs present the
power supply cooperatives with unattractive choices that can result in a
spiraling of bad events. A loss of revenue can require the cooperative to raise
rates or default on its debt. Raising rates could increase member
dissatisfaction, increasing the risk of members choosing a “buy-out” of their
contract and leaving the power supply cooperative. Having members leave

482. Jonas J. Monast, Electricity Competition and the Public Good: Rethinking
Markets and Monopolies, U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 669 (2019).
483. Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived To Rethink The Electric
Business Model, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 66 (2012).
484. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 520 (2016).
485. See Tri-State Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 326, at 27.
486. Id. at 60.
487. Id. at 24. “Sustained low natural gas prices could have an adverse effect on
the operation of our facilities and our cost of electric service.” Id.
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the cooperative would mean less revenue to cover fixed costs. These actions
could result in a lower credit rating, raising the cost of capital.
While DERs threaten power supply cooperatives, they present potential
benefits to distribution cooperatives. Energy efficiency investments reduce
customer bills. Demand side management programs can reduce the amount
of wholesale electricity the distribution cooperative needs to purchase at peak
times, reducing the demand charge portion of the wholesale electricity rate.
Distributed renewable energy – either customer-sited or “distribution scale”
systems that can plug into the local grid – can create jobs and reduce
transmission costs. Local energy and microgrids can help systems become
more resilient in the face of storms or wildfire.
But these benefits accrue to the distribution cooperative, not to the power
supply cooperative. To the power supply cooperative, they can be an
existential threat that imperils the financial health of the organization. In
addition, when a distribution cooperative reduces its electricity demand
through energy conservation or self-generation, it shifts costs to the other
distribution cooperatives that are part of the power supply cooperative. That
is because part of the rate that a distribution cooperative pays for wholesale
electricity covers the fixed costs of the cooperative, including debt service for
its capital investments. If one cooperative reduces its demand for electricity,
the other cooperatives will need to pay a higher share of the fixed costs of the
power supply cooperative. This is why Tri-State has sought to limit selfgeneration and to impose fees to recover “lost” fixed costs revenues from selfgeneration and from any PURPA interconnections.
These dynamics are not unique to cooperatives. Many utilities are
struggling with reduced electricity demand, the resulting need to raise rates,
and the potential of increased customer defections because of higher raised
rates – what has been described as a utility “death spiral.”488
In the cooperative context, however, this dynamic means that power
supply cooperative managers have an institutional incentive to protect their
business model. Allowing increased DER use by distribution cooperatives
reduces the power supply cooperative’s revenue, one of the factors likely
considered in executive compensation. Moreover, a significant loss of
revenue could spiral into increased rates, dissatisfaction and potential exit of
other member cooperatives, and potentially lower credit ratings. Cooperative
managers would likely be eager to avoid all of those outcomes, which would
be perceived negatively by the board of directors.
In short, many of the strategies for decarbonizing a power supply
cooperative have drawbacks from a manager’s perspective. Shutting down

488. See Mike O’Boyle, Three Ways Electric Utilities Can Avoid a Death Spiral,
FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/09/25
/three-ways-electric-utilities-can-avoid-a-death-spiral/#74d7c932758d
[perma.cc/MTW7-FYME].
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coal power plants with still-existing debt can lead to rate increases.
Transitioning from coal to renewables will likely reduce a power supply
cooperative’s assets and personnel, potentially impacting manager
compensation. Even more challenging is shifting generation to DERs, which
can threaten the business model of the power supply cooperative.

D. Coops Have Largely Been Exempted from Rigorous Resource
Planning Oversight
A final factor to identify is that addressing climate change is largely an
issue of resource planning in the face of substantial regulatory, financial, and
technological uncertainty. Many utilities are required to take part in rigorous
resource planning processes that test resource planning assumptions and
scenarios. These IRP processes reflect an updated understanding of the role
of utility oversight and recognize the various incentives that may skew
resource planning. Cooperatives, however, are largely exempted from
rigorous resource planning exercises.
As described in Section I.B., after nuclear power plant abandonments
and cost-overruns of the 1980s, regulators realized that utility commissions
could play a useful resource planning oversight function.489 Imposing an IRP
planning requirement represents an evolution in the theory of utility regulation
because it reflects a regulatory concern that goes beyond a concern over
exploitative rates and discrimination. The failure of utilities to accurately
project the costs of building nuclear plants, anticipate the level of future
electricity demand, or evaluate all least cost options harmed not only
ratepayers but also shareholders.490 Utility commissions recognized that
rigorous oversight of resource planning was valuable because of the highstakes of these decisions and the high degree of uncertainty involved.491
The long time-horizon in utility resource planning exacerbates the
principal-agent problem because neither the principle nor the agent may
believe that they will be personally affected by the long-term outcomes of
decisions. In particular, agents may be more focused on short-term
consequences – maintaining growth or putting off painful decisions – rather
than making prudent choices that will pay of decades down the road.
Moreover, institutional culture could shape expectations of reasonable future
assumptions and scenarios. Utilities that choose to model the possibility of
stringent future climate policies may make different investments than those
that do not. Finally, resource planning is highly technical. Oversight by board
members or non-technical managers may not identify biases or undue

489. Pamela Lesh, Planning for the Future, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 45, 47 (2009)
(“Since the offending assumptions and ultimate resource decisions had been largely
internal to the utilities, many believed that bringing the planning process and its key
assumptions into the public eye would be useful.”).
490. Id.
491. Id. at 48.
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narrowness in technical assumptions that have a significant bearing on the
outcome.
Resource planning exercises are now widespread, although they take
different forms in different contexts. In rate-regulated utilities, the utility is
often subject to a formal IRP proceeding. According to experts, robust
proceedings include “a meaningful stakeholder process and oversight from an
engaged public utilities commission” as well as requirements that the IRP
include detailed forecasting, evaluation of a full range of alternatives, and
accounting for risks and uncertainties.492
Many cooperatives do undergo some type of resource planning. For
example, in the West, all power supply cooperatives that are purchasers of
power from the Western Area Power Administration (“WAPA”) must submit
an integrated resource plan every 5 years.493 This includes major power
supply cooperatives such as Tri-State and Basin Electric.494 The WAPA IRP
regulations require that all plans “identify and compare of all practicable
energy efficiency and energy supply resource options,” and that they
“describe efforts to minimize adverse environmental effects of new resource
acquisitions.”495 Larger WAPA customers like power supply cooperatives
must “consider all reasonable opportunities to meet future energy service
requirements using DSM techniques [and] renewable energy resources.”496
WAPA also requires that in developing the IRP, the utilities “provide ample
opportunity for full public participation” and that the IRP note how the
customer responded to public comments.497
While these WAPA regulations are important, they fall short of a formal
IRP process before a utility commission. A Regulatory Assistance Project
assessment of best IRP practices stresses the importance of quasi-judicial
PUC processes that allow for stakeholder comments on an IRP to inform the
Commission’s “active role in assessing the validity of the inputs used by the
utilities in their filings, the resulting outcomes, and whether these are
consistent with both the IRP rules and the state’s energy policies and goals.”498
This quasi-judicial process is especially critical when it comes to preparing

492. WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 161, at 2.
493. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7275, 7276b (1992); see also Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 114,
42 U.S.C. § 1642 (2005); 10 C.F.R. §§ 905.10 (2020).
494. See TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION ASS’N, INTEGRATED
RESOURCE PLAN/ELECTRIC RESOURCE PLAN (2015); BASIN ELECTRIC POWER COOP.,
2018 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN (2019–2028) (2018).
495. 10 C.F.R. § 905.11(b) (2020); Integrated Resource Planning Guidelines,
WESTERN AREA POWER ADMIN. (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.wapa.gov:443/PowerMa
rketing/IRP/Pages/guidelines.aspx [perma.cc/T993-578M].
496. 10 C.F.R. § 905.11(c) (2020).
497. § 905.11(b)(4).
498. WILSON AND BIEWALD, supra note 161, at 27.
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for climate change because it can allow a public utility commission to hear
from expert intervenors that can challenge the assumptions, scenarios, and
outcomes of a utility IRP. This serves as an important check on institutional
and managerial biases in a very technical proceeding.
Outside of the WAPA process, however, few states subject cooperatives
to IRP proceedings.

E. Implications of Failure to Prudently Plan for the Shift to a LowCarbon Electricity System
This Section identifies four factors that have prevented cooperatives
from moving quickly to a low-carbon electricity system in contrast to other
utilities. The frequently distant and disperse benefits of addressing climate
change remove some of the advantages of the cooperative organizational
form. Cooperative managers have incentives to grow the size and budget of
cooperatives. The strategies necessary to respond to climate change – closing
fossil-fuel fired power plants, contracting for renewable energy, and
incorporating DERs – can run counter to this incentive. To the degree that
these strategies reduce wholesale power sales, they can also threaten the
viability of a power supply cooperative’s business model. Finally, shifting to
a low-carbon electricity system is an exercise in complex resource planning
in the face of uncertainty; however, cooperatives have been largely exempted
from a rigorous IRP process that could fully vet assumptions and scenario
choices against input from other stakeholder experts.
This Article argues that these factors explain why many cooperatives
have not moved as quickly as many other utilities to shift to a lower-carbon
electricity system and why they are in danger of continuing to lag behind.
Lagging behind on the shift to a low-carbon electricity system likely
carries significant consequences for cooperative member owners. As the TriState example shows, continuing down a fossil-heavy path will likely result
in higher electricity rates for distribution cooperative member owners,
especially if federal or state carbon regulations are put in place that
disadvantage utilities with a high-carbon portfolio.499
Continued fossil-fuel reliance could also lead to potential bankruptcy.
Kit Carson and DMEA left Tri-State because they saw an economic benefit
from leaving a slow-to-change power supply provider with a high-cost and
high-carbon generation portfolio, even given the need to “buyout” more than
10 years of their contract. For Tri-State, however, the loss of distribution
cooperative members reflects a potentially existential threat. If they continue
to lose members, they will not have the revenue base necessary to cover their
fixed costs and could end up defaulting on their loans.
This would not be the first time that power supply cooperatives have
gone bankrupt because of poor resource planning. In fact, some of Tri-State’s
499. MARK DYSON & ALEX ENGEL, A LOW-COST ENERGY FUTURE FOR WESTERN
COOPERATIVES: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATIVE ELECTRIC UTILITIES TO
PURSUE CLEAN ENERGY AT A COST SAVINGS TO THEIR MEMBERS 18 (2018).
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service territory was previously served by the Colorado-Ute Electric
Association, which went bankrupt in 1989 because it overinvested in a new
coal-fired power plant after projecting large growth in electricity demand that
failed to materialize.500 Other power supply cooperatives have similarly
entered bankruptcy for making poor investments. This includes the Southern
Montana Electric Generation & Transmission Cooperative in 2011, whose
bankruptcy was caused in part because of investments into a subsequently
abandoned coal-fired power plant.501 Wabash Valley Power Association in
Indiana, Cajun Electric Power in Louisiana, and the New Hampshire Electric
Cooperative all entered bankruptcy because of defaults related to investments
in an abandoned nuclear power plants, and the Vermont Electric Cooperative
narrowly avoided bankruptcy for the same reason.502
In short, allowing the status quo to prevail can have substantial
consequences for both cooperative member owners and for U.S. climate
policy. Allowing power supply cooperatives to continue resource planning
without rigorous oversight risks the equity of less affluent rural member
owners. Alternatively, lack of oversight of imprudent resource decisionmaking could lead to more expensive federal or state bailouts in the future.
Cooperatives have historically been very successful in lobbying
legislatures.503 Failure to take prudent action now could lead to requests for
large-scale cooperative bailouts in the future, based on arguments that a
disproportionate part of the cost of clean energy transition will fall on
cooperatives.

500. HATLESTAD ET AL., supra note 475, at 2–3; Victor H. Palmieri, Better
Answers Than Bankruptcy, 32 MGMT. Q., Winter 1991–92.
501. Clair Johnson, Plan Filed to Save Bankrupt Power Co-op, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(Feb. 18, 2013), https://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/planfiled-to-save-bankrupt-power-co-op/article_17af476e-48f2-51c2-8cece8d2c338e330.html [perma.cc/HQ7A-9DGZ].
502. Laurie Asseo, High Court Lets Stand Electric Cooperative’s Bankruptcy
Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 4, 1996); Cajun, In Regulatory Squeeze, Seeks
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK (Dec. 26, 1994); John
Milne, Power Bill to Increase for Several, THE BOSTON GLOBE (May 12, 1991);
Vermont Electric Cooperative Averts Bankruptcy Following REA Assurances,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK (Sept. 1, 1986).
503. Fischlein et al., supra note 23, at 780 (“geographical pervasiveness of COUs
provides them with considerable political clout”); Cooper, supra note 33, at 342 n.48
(The Center for Responsive Politics ranks NRECA as the sixty-fifth largest donor in
American politics from 1989 to 2006, with contributions of $9.9 million).
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V. STRENGTHENING COOP SUPPORTS AND OVERSIGHT TO ADDRESS
CLIMATE CHANGE
The previous Section argued that cooperatives should not be viewed as
“self-regulating” when it comes to making prudent resource planning
decisions in the face of climate change. This Section suggests ways that the
system of cooperative regulation could be strengthened to ensure that
structural barriers and institutional incentives are not preventing cooperatives
from taking economically prudent actions to shift to a low-carbon electricity
system. It also suggests ways that state and federal actors can facilitate and
incentivize such actions.
First, a few caveats. Federal clean energy or GHG reduction mandates
would be the most direct way to achieve a shift by cooperatives to a lowcarbon electricity system. This Article, however, is focused on changes to
regulatory requirements and institutional supports that will help ensure that
cooperatives make prudent choices on whether and how to shift to a lowcarbon electricity system.
One reason for this choice is because there is already an extensive
literature discussing options for federal climate policy.504 In addition, the
Trump Administration is currently rolling back the GHG standards
promulgated by the Obama Administration for the electricity sector. But even
if a future Administration were to put in place an aggressive climate policy, it
is quite likely that such a policy would offer utilities flexibility in how they
achieve required reductions, at least based on recent precedents.505 So even
under an ambitious federal policy, cooperatives will still likely need to make
choices about how to shift to a low-carbon electricity system.
In the absence of a strong federal policy it is plausible that a number of
factors will combine to continue driving an industry-wide shift to a lowcarbon electricity system, although not as quickly as climate change requires.
These include continued leadership by a number of states through clean
electricity mandates and through GHG reduction policies such as the cap-andtrade programs in California and the Northeast.506 These also include
continuing advances in low-carbon grid technologies and attendant reductions

504. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009); Hari
M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama
Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 238 (2011); Robert Sussman, Designing the New
Green Deal: Where’s the Sweet Spot?, 49 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10428
(2019)
505. See Tom Krisher, Politics of Climate Change Put Corporations in Tough
Spot, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 30, 2019), https://apnews.com/a4bbcd6b04014d27aca
276bc08733c28 [perma.cc/2JBB-BVD2].
506. See Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Targets and Market-based
Policies, NAT’L CONF. OF S. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/res
earch/energy/greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-targets-and-market-basedpolicies.aspx [perma.cc/UD3B-BS45].
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in cost – including renewable energy and battery storage – as well as
improvements in grid-operations. Other factors include increasing demand
from commercial consumers for zero-carbon electricity and from private
lenders.507 In this environment, cooperatives will first face a choice of
whether to lower the carbon intensity of their generation mix and to what
degree, and then how to do so.
This Article proposes changes to the system of cooperative oversight and
supports that will remove structural barriers, counter unhelpful institutional
incentives, and strengthen resource planning to promote prudent cooperative
resource decision-making.
A second caveat is that this Article does not entertain a wholesale
transformation away from the cooperative model. There are both benefits and
drawbacks to the cooperative utility model in comparison to for-profit utilities
or publicly-owned utilities, discussed infra in Sections I.C. and III.B. From a
pragmatic perspective, however, cooperatives are well-established institutions
with substantial political power and a complicated set of legal rights. A
wholesale transformation away from cooperative utilities does not seem
feasible, and therefore, this Article does not address whether cooperatives are
better or worse than other forms of utility ownership for the purpose of
transitioning in response to climate change.

A. States Should Include Coops in Clean Energy Resource Planning
Mandates
Many scholars have chronicled how states have led the innovation of
low-carbon and clean energy policies in the United States and why such state
leadership is part of a beneficial state-federal iterative process in the
development and refinement of such policies.508
Those states that have historically led in this field are increasing the
ambition of their climate and energy policies. In just the past two years, 10
states have increased their clean energy mandates. California, New Mexico,
New York, and Washington also joined Hawaii in establishing 100% zerocarbon electricity targets.509

507. Mike Scott, Companies Continue To Drive Demand For Clean Energy,
FORBES, (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikescott/2019/09/09/compan
ies-continue-to-drive-demand-for-clean-energy/ [perma.cc/VZH3-S5J4].
508. See e.g., Vicki Arroyo et al., State Innovation on Climate Change: Reducing
Emissions from Key Sectors While Preparing for a New Normal, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 385 (2016); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW.
U.L. REV. 1097 (2009).
509. Barbose, supra note 473, at 12.

2020]

GREENING THE OLD NEW DEAL

489

In the past, states have largely either exempted cooperatives from these
targets or applied weaker targets to cooperatives.510 Cooperatives have argued
that meeting the targets imposes a higher burden for them because they cannot
directly reap the benefits of federal tax credits because their rural memberowners are less able to pay for any related cost increases or because smaller
cooperatives are less able to deal with the administrative requirements of
compliance.
Given the need to decarbonize the electricity sector, exempting
cooperatives from these mandates has been counter-productive. State
renewable energy mandates have been a leading driver of renewable energy
deployment in the United States.511 They have also forced utilities to develop
mechanisms and business models for renewable energy procurement and RPS
compliance. Many of the utilities subject to state clean energy mandates are
now benefitting from lower-cost electricity thanks to price drops of renewable
energy.
In contrast, exempting cooperatives from these mandates allowed for
continued reliance on fossil-fuel fired power plants and potentially increased
incentives to build new natural gas power plants.
There are significant equity factors related to imposing clean energy
mandates on cooperatives. For-profit utilities that build their own renewable
generation can reap more of the federal renewable energy tax-credit benefit
than a cooperative working with a for-profit renewable energy developer. It
is also true that cooperatives may have a greater proportion of lower-income
customers that are less able to shoulder cost increases. But these disparate
circumstances would best be addressed through other policies that directly
target these disparities. For example, this can be achieved through state rural
energy subsidies or through low-income energy efficiency and energy
assistance programs.
Notably, New Mexico and Colorado did not exempt cooperatives from
their recent increases of clean energy mandates.512 Other states should follow
their lead.
Similarly, states should apply IRP requirements to power supply
cooperatives. A formal IRP process,513 with opportunities for intervenors to
vet assumptions, scenarios, and forecasts, is the best way to counter potential
institutional biases and incentives described in Section III that can inhibit
cooperatives from taking prudent action to transition to the low-carbon
economy. Colorado recently subjected Tri-State to IRP requirements, and
several other states also require IRPs.

510. Id. at 8. State operated GHG cap-and-trade programs in California and the
northeast do require cooperatives that own qualifying fossil-fuel generation facilities
to participate in those programs.
511. Barbose, supra note 473, at 4.
512. See supra Part II.B.6.
513. See supra Parts I.B.1 and III.D.
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B. Allow Distribution Coops to Innovate, Require Power Supply
Cooperatives to Compete
While the shift to a more decentralized electricity grid potentially
benefits rural distribution cooperatives, it threatens the traditional power
supply-distribution cooperative relationship. Nearly all generation is
provided by the power supply cooperative, and there are significant
constraints in terms of self-generation limits and fees on distribution
cooperatives to prevent loss of revenue to the power supply cooperative.
The traditional relationship between power supply and distribution
cooperative assumes that the power supply cooperative provides nearly all
electricity related services to its member distribution cooperatives. The model
envisions that the power supply cooperative and its member cooperatives
comprise a self-contained energy island. This no longer reflects reality.
Distribution cooperatives and their customers are increasingly generating
electricity, and power supply cooperatives already sell electricity to nonmembers through power purchase agreements and short-term markets.
It is not yet known how decentralized the grid will become in the shift
to a low-carbon electricity system. This will depend on how technologies and
grid management practices evolve, what policy choices are made by
regulators and grid operators, and what kind of business models are developed
by different actors. Part of what is needed now is innovation and
experimentation to identify potential business models that can support the
shift to a low-carbon electricity system.
Maintaining tight self-generation limits and punitive fees on distribution
cooperatives prohibits this type of innovation and experimentation.
Maintaining this model also inhibits deployments of technologies and systems
that have the potential to benefit rural consumers. Distributed renewable
generation, both customer-sited and distribution-grid scale, has the potential
to reduce rural electricity costs, create local economic activity, and improve
resilience. Similarly, energy efficiency and demand side management
programs can reduce electricity demand and associated transmission costs.
That is not to dismiss concerns about reduced revenue to power supply
cooperatives – these concerns have merit, especially since increased local
generation may unfairly shift fixed-costs from one distribution cooperative to
others.
But there are alternatives to the simple and unchanging wholesale
electricity rate structure that is currently in use by power supply cooperatives.
In the for-profit utility context, utility commissions have experimented with
rate models that give utility incentives for reducing energy usage (as opposed
to selling more electricity).514 Similarly, value-of-solar proceedings seek to
514. Utility Rate Decoupling, ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY (Oct. 14, 2013),
https://www.ase.org/resources/utility-rate-decoupling-0 [perma.cc/6ME2-J2PA].
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identify the full value of distributed renewable energy while simultaneously
valuing the benefits of wires and other infrastructure that the utility is
bringing.515
A power supply cooperative could similarly review options for changing
rate structures and membership terms to provide additional flexibility and
incentives to distribution cooperatives to shift to clean electricity.
It is notable that in response to actions by Kit Carson and DMEA, TriState has proposed a new contract model that would allow some distribution
cooperatives to significantly increase local generation.516 This shows that the
structure of power supply cooperatives can evolve.
The RUS could support such rate structure experimentation through
technical assistance and through changes to its regulations governing
wholesale power contracts.
There are additional legal tools that can and should be used to sharpen
incentives for power supply cooperatives to consider such reforms.
First, states can and should provide formal PUC oversight in power
supply buyout negotiations, as the Colorado Commission has sought to do.
Where FERC has jurisdiction over a power supply cooperative, it should do
the same. Allowing fair buyouts from a power supply cooperative is an
important structural mechanism that places competitive pressure on power
supply cooperatives to respond to the demands of its distribution cooperative
members. In contrast, the power supply cooperative has a strong incentive to
prevent such defections because they can lead to rate increases for remaining
members and to decreases in credit ratings. A formal PUC or FERC
regulatory proceeding to ensure that the buyout offer is “just and reasonable”
can prevent the power supply cooperative from offering an inflated buyout
cost.
Second, FERC can continue to affirm that PURPA supersedes the power
supply contract and that power supply cooperatives cannot add fees on top of
a distribution cooperative’s avoided cost rate (or negotiated rate) with a
PURPA qualifying facility. This would allow small renewable energy
generators to compete with the power supply cooperative to provide
wholesale power to distribution cooperatives.

515. Coley Girouard, Utility Regulators Were Busy in 2015. Here Are the Top 10
Issues They Dealt With, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/top-10-utility-commission-issues-of2015#gs.7olczj [perma.cc/79FV-VVJ3].
516. See discussion supra note 427; see also Joe Smyth, Tri-State Expects Member
Co-ops to Support Bylaw Changes at Annual Meeting, CLEAN COOPERATIVE (Mar. 18,
2019), https://www.cleancooperative.com/news/tri-state-expects-member-co-ops-tosupport-bylaw-changes-at-annual-meeting [perma.cc/Y24M-66KC].
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C. Use RUS to Incentivize the Shift to Low-Carbon Electricity
The REA and RUS have played an important part of the governance of
rural cooperatives, most importantly through the design of the loan programs
and technical assistance that they provided.
In an administration favorable to climate change policies, the RUS
should be used to incentivize the shift to a low-carbon electricity system. This
should include expanding current programs to offer loans for energy
efficiency and renewable energy programs. The RUS should go beyond
existing programs in two important ways.
First, the RUS should explore ways to ease the closure of cooperativeowned coal power plants and to support the provision of transition assistance
for workers and communities.517 Cooperatives have legitimate claims that the
FUA, as well as the structure of renewable incentives, pushed them to a coalheavy generation portfolio. Retiring coal plants before the end of their useful
life – and before their debt service is paid off – can impose high costs to rural
owner operators. This raises legitimate concerns that rural residents are being
burdened with a disproportionately high cost in the transition to a low-carbon
economy.
This is not unlike the task that the REA undertook in electrifying rural
America in the first place. The rural electricity sector will be more expensive
to transition, and rural residents generally less able to bear the brunt of that
cost. As a starting place, the RUS could look at ways to use subsidies to
relieve costs of prematurely abandoning coal plants.
Second, the RUS should provide technical assistance for the transition.
Chief among this might be facilitating the development of new rate models
between power supply cooperatives and distribution cooperatives. Other
opportunities include developing assistance for purchasing energy storage
resources, integrating distribution scale renewable energy, and preparing
electricity grids to operate with a much higher proportion of renewable grid.

D. Give Coops an Out
Finally, as other scholars have noted, having a large number of small
cooperatives is inefficient in the electricity sector, especially when member
participation is low, some cooperatives are poorly managed, and the challenge
of clean energy transition requires leadership and resources.
Relaxing merger policies would allow cooperatives to consider other
options – including privatization and merger with other cooperatives – that
may help add capacity to these organizations to prudently plan for the lowcarbon transition. 518
517. See proposed solutions in HATLESTAD ET AL., supra note 475, at 11–14.
518. Jeter et al., supra note 3, at 386 (citing Cooper, supra note 33, at 364).

2020]

GREENING THE OLD NEW DEAL

493

VI. CONCLUSION
Roosevelt’s New Deal harnessed cooperatives to electrify rural America
when the private sector would not. Cooperatives were successful in part
because the cooperative structure reduced costs and motivated contributions
from member-owners. Because cooperatives were democratic, non-profit
organizations, they were seen as self-regulating and therefore largely
exempted from rate regulation intended to prevent unfair rate setting by
monopoly, for-profit utilities.
But cooperatives have also struggled with efficient and competent
administration. They generally have very low participation by members, and
boards often provide weak oversight without a high level of technical
oversight capacity.
These weaknesses are magnified when responding to climate change,
which will require a near complete decarbonization of the electricity sector.
The key challenge for utilities of all types is prudent resource planning in the
face of substantial technological, cost, and regulatory uncertainty.
Cooperatives have lagged behind other types of utilities when it comes
to reducing reliance on fossil fuel power plants, especially coal, and shifting
to zero-carbon resources. This is in part because of structural reasons; many
power supply cooperatives built power plants at a time when federal law
required such plants to be “coal capable,” and cooperatives are frequently
unable to take direct advantage of federal renewable energy tax credits. But
it is also because power supply cooperatives have institutional incentives to
continue investments in traditional power plants and disincentives to use
PPAs for renewable energy or to allow distribution cooperatives to reduce
demand by adopting DERs or energy conservation strategies.
Changes to the state-federal system of cooperative regulation and
support could counter these incentives and facilitate prudent resource
planning by cooperatives. Among the most important of these suggestions
are that state PUC’s assert jurisdiction over the “buyout” calculations of
cooperatives and require formal IRP planning. This also includes having RUS
support the shutdown of coal plants and provide technical support to develop
new wholesale electricity rate structures between power supply and
distribution cooperatives.
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